mirror of
https://github.com/labring/FastGPT.git
synced 2026-05-08 01:08:43 +08:00
6b61359516
* fix(sandbox): 重构代码沙盒,支持内置函数和网络请求 (#6462) * feat(sandbox): 重写代码沙盒 - Bun + Hono + 统一子进程模型 - 运行时: Node.js → Bun - HTTP 框架: NestJS + Fastify → Hono - JS 执行: isolated-vm → Bun 子进程(与 Python 统一) - 架构: 统一子进程模型,JS 和 Python 共享同一套执行引擎 - SubprocessRunner 基类,JS/Python 各自继承 - ProcessPool 进程池预热(SANDBOX_JS_POOL_SIZE / SANDBOX_PYTHON_POOL_SIZE) - SystemHelper 命名空间(JS 端保留向后兼容全局函数) - 临时文件系统隔离 + 路径遍历防护 + 磁盘配额 - 请求级资源限制(timeoutMs / memoryMB / diskMB) - JS: 原型链冻结 + Bun API 禁用 + Function 构造器注入 safe require(模块白名单) - Python: 宿主侧正则预检 + __import__ 拦截 + resource 限制 - 移除: @nestjs/*(6个包)、fastify、isolated-vm、node-gyp、reflect-metadata、rxjs - 新增: hono - 保留: tiktoken - 新增用户可用包: lodash、dayjs、axios、moment、uuid、crypto-js、qs - 67 个测试全部通过(单元测试 + 安全测试 + 集成测试) - vitest 独立配置,不影响全局 * fix(sandbox): 安全加固 - 扩展 Bun API 封锁、清理 process.env、闭包封装 Python import 拦截 - JS: 扩展 Bun 危险 API 封锁列表(serve/connect/listen/udpSocket/dns/plugin/build/Transpiler) - JS: 清理 process.env,仅保留沙箱必要变量,防止泄露敏感环境变量 - Python: 用闭包封装 _safe_import,del 掉 _original_import/_make_safe_import/_BLOCKED_MODULES 防止用户代码恢复原始 __import__ - Dockerfile: 复制 bun.lock 并使用 --frozen-lockfile 确保构建可复现 * fix(sandbox): 将 sandbox 从 pnpm workspace 中移除,独立管理依赖 * fix(sandbox): 从全局 vitest 移除 sandbox 测试,集成测试无 SANDBOX_URL 时跳过 * ci(sandbox): 添加独立测试 workflow,仅 sandbox 代码变更时触发 * refactor(sandbox): 使用 export default 启动方式,与 sandbox_server 保持一致 * fix: sandbox security hardening & comprehensive test suite Security fixes: - JS: freeze Function constructor to block constructor.constructor escape - JS: handle undefined return from main() (serialize as null) - Python: fix http_request using from-import after __import__ interception - Python: __import__ whitelist mode blocks exec/eval import bypasses New tests (223 passing): - security/escape-attacks: JS/Python escape attack vectors - security/network-security: IP blacklist, protocol restrictions, httpRequest - compat/legacy-js: 18 backward compatibility tests - compat/legacy-python: 21 backward compatibility tests - boundary: timeout, memory, disk, edge cases - examples: common user code patterns * feat(sandbox): env vars for all limits + rewrite README - Network limits configurable via env: SANDBOX_MAX_REQUESTS, SANDBOX_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE - Resource upper bounds configurable: SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_MEMORY_MB, SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB - README: architecture, API docs, env var reference, how to add JS/Python packages, security overview, built-in functions * refactor(sandbox): extract env.ts with dotenv for typed env loading - New env.ts: dotenv.config() + typed helpers (str/int/bool) - config.ts re-exports env for backward compatibility - index.ts imports env first to ensure .env loaded before anything else * refactor(sandbox): use zod for env validation and type coercion - Replace manual parseInt/str helpers with zod schema + coerce - Invalid env vars now fail fast with formatted error on startup - dotenv + zod, clean and declarative * chore(sandbox): remove unused process pool code - Delete pool.ts and pool.test.ts (pool was never wired into runners) - Remove PoolConfig/PooledProcess types - Remove pool env vars from env.ts - Clean up README * feat(sandbox): add concurrency limiter with semaphore - New Semaphore utility for max concurrent subprocess control - SANDBOX_MAX_CONCURRENCY env var (default 50) - Excess requests queue instead of spawning unbounded processes - Health endpoint exposes concurrency stats (current/queued/max) * test(sandbox): add semaphore tests and expand coverage to 292 cases - New semaphore.test.ts (11 tests): acquire/release, queuing, FIFO, stats, serial execution - JS runner: blank code, template literals, primitive returns, more modules, unicode, partial limits - Python runner: blank code, triple quotes, primitive returns, unicode, null vars, division errors - JS security: process.exit, globalThis, Symbol.unscopables, Proxy, dynamic import, path traversal - Python security: pickle/multiprocessing/threading/ctypes/signal, exec bypass, __subclasses__ - Escape attacks: type() class creation, __builtins__ tampering, getattr access - Boundary: long vars, special JSON chars, float precision, big ints, circular refs, Promise.reject * test(sandbox): test-master review - add 31 tests, coverage report - base-runner.test.ts (10): BaseRunner precheck, temp dir, semaphore integration - semaphore-race.test.ts (5): race conditions, rapid acquire/release, stress test - coverage-gaps.test.ts (16): security coverage gaps found during review - REVIEW-REPORT.md: full test audit report Total: 323 passed, 0 failed * fix(sandbox): address PR #6439 review issues Security fixes: - Intercept Python builtins.open(), restrict file access to sandbox tmpdir - Remove unused pool.ts, warmup.mjs, warmup.py (security risk) - Fix DNS rebinding TOCTOU: use resolved IP for HTTP connections - Fix symlink path traversal: use realpath instead of normpath - Add try/finally cleanup for __import__ hook Robustness: - Add __SANDBOX_RESULT__ prefix to stdout parsing, prevent user output interference - Fix disk quota tracking: deduct old file size on overwrite - Add __import__() pattern scanning in Python precheck Tests: - Fix eval+__import__ test assertion (accept both catch and fail paths) All 323 tests passing. * fix(sandbox): remove warmup scripts COPY from Dockerfile * docs(sandbox): add technical design document * feat(sandbox): configurable module allowlist/blocklist via env vars - SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES: JS require whitelist (comma-separated) - SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES: Python import blacklist (comma-separated) - Defaults unchanged, fully backward compatible * fix(sandbox): 修复多个安全漏洞 1. Python HTTPS DNS rebinding: HTTPS 请求现在也使用 resolved IP 发起连接 2. Python __import__ hook 恢复漏洞: 移除 finally 块中恢复原始 __import__ 的代码 3. Python 内部变量泄露: 用户代码执行前删除 _os, _socket 等内部模块引用 4. JS process 危险 API: 禁用 process.binding/dlopen/kill/chdir 等,冻结 process.env 5. Python open() fd 绕过: 阻止通过整数文件描述符绕过路径检查 6. API 输入校验: 使用 zod schema 校验请求体,限制代码大小 1MB 7. 无认证警告: SANDBOX_TOKEN 未设置时输出生产环境警告 新增 security-fixes.test.ts 包含所有修复的回归测试 * test: consolidate security tests + add integration test suite - Merge 6 security test files into 1 consolidated security.test.ts (109 tests) - JS/Python module interception (precheck + runtime) - JS escape attacks (prototype, constructor, Reflect, globalThis) - Python escape attacks (__import__ hook, exec/eval, internal vars, __subclasses__) - SSRF protection (private IPs, cloud metadata, file protocol) - File system isolation (path traversal, fd, disk quota) - Variable injection attacks - API input validation - Add black-box integration test suite functional.test.ts (56 tests) - Basic operations (math, string, array, JSON, regex, Date, Promise, Map/Set) - Variable passing (string, number, complex objects, empty, multiple) - Whitelisted modules (crypto-js, moment, lodash) - SystemHelper/system_helper (fs, delay, strToBase64, httpRequest) - Error handling (syntax, runtime, undefined var, timeout) - Network requests (GET, POST) - Complex scenarios (CSV pipeline, recursion, class definition) - Remove 34 duplicate test cases across merged files - Total: 363 passed, 8 skipped (integration API tests need server) * fix(sandbox): z.record() zod v4 compatibility - add key type param * feat(sandbox): add .env.template with all config options and comments * refactor(sandbox): remove disk write support and temp filesystem * test(sandbox): remove all fs-related tests and add test case inventory - Remove fs read/write tests from unit, integration, boundary, examples - Remove path traversal, absolute path, open fd, builtins.open tests from security - Add comprehensive test/case.md with all 344 test cases categorized - All tests pass: 344 passed, 8 skipped, 0 failed * feat(sandbox): add GET /sandbox/modules API to list available packages and builtins * test(sandbox): add unit tests for GET /sandbox/modules API * refactor(test): rewrite api.test.ts to use app.request() - no external server needed * feat(sandbox): validate SANDBOX_TOKEN charset in env schema (ASCII printable only) * chore(sandbox): remove DESIGN.md and package-lock.json from PR * feat(sandbox): replace spawn-per-request with process pool architecture - Add ProcessPool (JS) and PythonProcessPool with long-lived worker processes - Workers communicate via stdin/stdout line-based JSON protocol - Pool size configurable via SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE env var (default 20) - Auto-respawn workers on crash - Semaphore-based queueing when requests exceed pool size Performance gains (simple functions): - JS: 22 QPS → 1,328 QPS (60x improvement) - Python: 14.7 QPS → 3,395 QPS (231x improvement) - Fix import.meta.dir compatibility for vitest (Node) environments - Export poolReady promise for test initialization - Add benchmark scripts to test/benchmark/ - All 354 tests passing (12 test files) * chore(sandbox): clean up unused files, update README with pool architecture - Remove test/REVIEW-REPORT.md, test/case.md, test/benchmark.ts (obsolete) - Rewrite README: pool architecture diagram, performance benchmarks, SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE config, project structure, health endpoint format * fix(sandbox): 修复进程池超时后 worker respawn 竞态条件 根因:超时 kill worker 后,exit 事件是异步的,release() 先执行时 worker 还在列表里,死 worker 被放回 idle 池,后续请求发给死进程。 修复: - 超时回调中先 removeWorker 再 kill,防止 release 归还死 worker - removeWorker 返回 bool,exit 事件中避免重复 respawn - 超时回调主动触发 spawnWorker 补充池 - release 检查 worker 是否仍在池中 - spawnWorker 完成时检查 waitQueue 直接分配 * fix: security hardening & test migration to process pool - JS worker: harden process object (kill/chdir/env freeze/binding/dlopen) - Python worker: stack-frame based __import__ hook to block exec/eval bypass - Python worker: BuiltinsProxy to prevent __import__ override via builtins module - Python worker: restricted __builtins__ dict in exec_globals (no internal refs) - Python worker: restore __import__ before each execution - Migrate all 9 test files from JsRunner/PythonRunner to ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool - Configure vitest for serial execution (pool size=1, fileParallelism: false) - Fix security test assertion for builtins tampering (success=true with escaped=false) - All 102 security tests passing * docs(sandbox): update README with accurate benchmark data, remove non-existent features - Update performance table with latest benchmark results (JS 1414 QPS, Python 4247 QPS) - Remove SANDBOX_DISK_MB/SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB env vars (not implemented) - Remove SystemHelper.fs.* / system_helper.fs.* docs (not implemented in workers) - Fix security section to match actual implementation - Update test count to 351 * refactor(sandbox): remove legacy runner/sandbox/template code - Delete src/runner/ (base.ts, js-runner.ts, python-runner.ts) - Delete src/sandbox/ (js-template.ts, python-template.ts, network-config.ts) - Delete test/unit/js-runner.test.ts, test/unit/python-runner.test.ts - Keep src/utils/semaphore.ts (generic utility, has its own tests) - Update README project structure and test count (297 cases) All functionality is now in src/pool/ (process-pool architecture). 297 tests passing, 0 failures. * test(sandbox): add process pool lifecycle/respawn/concurrency tests - ProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, worker crash respawn, timeout respawn, pool-full queuing, concurrent crash isolation - PythonProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, timeout respawn, queuing - 14 new test cases, total 311 passing * fix(sandbox): ping/pong health check, replace httpbin.org with baidu.com - Worker health check: send actual ping message and verify pong response instead of only checking stdin.writable (detects stuck workers) - JS worker.ts: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - Python worker.py: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool: rewrite pingWorker to send ping, wait for pong with timeout, replace worker on failure - Replace all httpbin.org URLs with www.baidu.com in tests (httpbin.org unreachable from China/Sealos Devbox) - Add 4 new health check tests (ping/pong for JS and Python pools) - All 318 tests passing, 0 failures * docs: add test report (test/README.md) and update README testing section - test/README.md: detailed report with 315 passed / 3 skipped / 0 failed - README.md: updated test section with coverage dimensions table and link to report * docs: add functional test cases checklist (110 cases) * fix(sandbox): fix Dockerfile Python env and import detection 1. Dockerfile: Remove broken multi-stage Python 3.11 copy. - The previous approach copied python3 binary from python:3.11-alpine but missed libpython3.11.so.1.0, causing Python pool init failure. - Now uses system Python from apk and installs pip packages directly. 2. worker.py: Fix false positive import blocking for third-party packages. - numpy/pandas were blocked because their internal 'import os' was detected as user-initiated (full stack scan found user code frames). - Changed to check only the direct caller frame: if the import comes from site-packages (third-party lib internals), allow it. - Direct user imports of blocked modules are still properly rejected. * fix(sandbox): block dynamic import() and restrict file system access Security fixes found during deep review: 1. JS: Block import() dynamic imports that bypass require whitelist. - import('fs') could read arbitrary files on the container. - Added static regex check to reject code containing import(). 2. Python: Restrict open() to prevent user code from reading files. - open('/etc/passwd') was accessible from user code. - Added _restricted_open() that checks caller frame: only allows stdlib/site-packages internal calls, blocks user code (<string>). 3. Python: Remove duplicate return statement in _safe_import. All 315 tests pass (3 skipped). * test(sandbox): add regression tests for import() and open() security fixes - JS: import('fs'), import('child_process'), import('os') blocked - JS: string containing 'import' not false-positive - Python: open('/etc/passwd'), open('/proc/self/environ'), open('/tmp/evil.txt', 'w') blocked - Python: numpy internal open() not affected (conditional on numpy availability) Total: 322 passed | 3 skipped (was 315 passed) * docs(sandbox): rewrite sandbox documentation with JS + Python coverage - Add Python language support documentation - Add httpRequest/http_request function docs - Add available modules list (JS whitelist + Python safe modules) - Add security restrictions section - Add practical examples (data processing, date calc, webhook signing) - Add JS/Python function name mapping table * docs(sandbox): use SystemHelper/system_helper for built-in functions Direct calls (countToken, delay, etc.) are deprecated (kept for compat). All examples now use SystemHelper.xxx() / system_helper.xxx(). * docs(sandbox): Python only show named-params style as recommended * feat(sandbox): unify Python SystemHelper API with camelCase aliases - Add camelCase aliases to Python SystemHelper: countToken, strToBase64, createHmac, httpRequest (matching JS API exactly) - Update docs to use SystemHelper uniformly for both JS and Python - snake_case methods (count_token, etc.) still work for backward compat * feat(sandbox): add matplotlib and increase HTTP timeout to 60s - Add matplotlib to Python dependencies - Increase HTTP request timeout from 10s to 60s (both JS and Python) - Update docs accordingly * docs(sandbox): split docs for old/new sandbox versions - sandbox.mdx → '代码运行(旧版)' for FastGPT ≤ 4.14.7 (URL unchanged) - sandbox-v5.mdx → '代码运行' for FastGPT ≥ 4.14.8 - Both pages cross-link to each other - meta.json updated: sandbox-v5 listed before sandbox * docs: rename old sandbox doc to 代码运行(弃) * refactor(sandbox): remove SANDBOX_TIMEOUT, use SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT as unified timeout * fix(sandbox): add build dependencies for matplotlib in Dockerfile * refactor(sandbox): migrate Python from blocklist to allowlist for module control - Change SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES to SANDBOX_PYTHON_ALLOWED_MODULES - Update Python worker to use allowlist instead of blocklist - Add comprehensive safe module list: math, json, datetime, numpy, pandas, etc. - Improve error message: 'Module X is not in the allowlist' - Consistent with JS allowlist approach for better security * fix(sandbox): add _strptime to allowlist and update test assertions - Add _strptime module (required by datetime.strptime) - Update test assertions for Python module import errors - All 325 tests now pass (322 passed, 3 skipped) * fix(docs): center SVG icon in size-5 container on medium screens * docs(sandbox): simplify built-in functions and improve module documentation - Remove delay, countToken, strToBase64, createHmac functions (keep only httpRequest) - Convert Python module list to table format (10 tables by category) - Reorganize usage examples with collapsible sections (JS and Python) - Fix icon alignment in desktop/mobile sidebar navigation - All 325 tests passing --------- Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev> Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai> Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local> * perf: code sandbox * update action * Update projects/app/src/components/core/chat/ChatContainer/ChatBox/index.tsx Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * update timeout * update memory limit function * sandbox * perf: process poll * env template * feat: code tip * fix: code sandbox error tip * update memory limit fn * update memory limit fn * fix: test * fix: test * fix: sandbox --------- Co-authored-by: Archer <archer@fastgpt.io> Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev> Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai> Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local> Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
313 lines
9.0 KiB
Markdown
313 lines
9.0 KiB
Markdown
# FastGPT Code Sandbox
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基于 Bun + Hono 的代码执行沙盒,支持 JS 和 Python。采用进程池架构,预热长驻 worker 进程,通过 stdin/stdout JSON 协议通信,消除每次请求的进程启动开销。
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## 架构
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```
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HTTP Request → Hono Server → Process Pool → Worker (long-lived) → Result
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↓
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┌──────────────┐
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│ JS Workers │ bun run worker.ts (×N)
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│ Py Workers │ python3 worker.py (×N)
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└──────────────┘
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stdin: JSON task → stdout: JSON result
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```
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- **进程池**:启动时预热 N 个 worker 进程(默认 20),请求到达时直接分配空闲 worker,执行完归还池中
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- **JS 执行**:Bun worker 进程 + 安全 shim(禁用 Bun API、冻结 Function 构造器、require 白名单)
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- **Python 执行**:python3 worker 进程 + `__import__` 拦截 + resource 资源限制
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- **网络请求**:统一通过 `SystemHelper.httpRequest()` / `system_helper.http_request()` 收口,内置 SSRF 防护
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- **并发控制**:请求数超过池大小时自动排队,worker 崩溃自动重启补充
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## 性能
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进程池 vs 旧版 spawn-per-request 对比(SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE=20):
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| 场景 | 旧版 QPS / P50 | 进程池 QPS / P50 | 提升 |
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|------|----------------|------------------|------|
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| JS 简单函数 (c50) | 22 / 1,938ms | 1,414 / 7ms | **64x** |
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| JS IO 500ms (c50) | 22 / 2,107ms | 38 / 1,005ms | 1.7x |
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| JS 高 CPU (c10) | 9 / 1,079ms | 12 / 796ms | 1.3x |
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| JS 高内存 (c10) | — | 13 / 787ms | — |
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| Python 简单函数 (c50) | 14.7 / 2,897ms | 4,247 / 4ms | **289x** |
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| Python IO 500ms (c50) | 14.2 / 3,066ms | 38 / 1,003ms | 2.7x |
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| Python 高 CPU (c10) | 3.1 / 2,845ms | 4 / 2,191ms | 1.3x |
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| Python 高内存 (c10) | — | 11 / 893ms | — |
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资源占用(20+20 workers):空闲 ~1.5GB RSS,压测峰值 ~2GB RSS。
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## 快速开始
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```bash
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# 安装依赖
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bun install
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# 开发运行
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bun run src/index.ts
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# 运行测试
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bun run test
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```
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## Docker
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```bash
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# 构建
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docker build -f projects/sandbox/Dockerfile -t fastgpt-sandbox .
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# 运行
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docker run -p 3000:3000 \
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-e SANDBOX_TOKEN=your-secret-token \
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-e SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE=20 \
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fastgpt-sandbox
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```
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## API
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### `POST /sandbox/js`
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执行 JavaScript 代码。
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```json
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{
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"code": "async function main(variables) {\n return { result: variables.a + variables.b }\n}",
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"variables": { "a": 1, "b": 2 }
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}
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```
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### `POST /sandbox/python`
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执行 Python 代码。
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```json
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{
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"code": "def main(variables):\n return {'result': variables['a'] + variables['b']}",
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"variables": { "a": 1, "b": 2 }
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}
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```
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### `GET /health`
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健康检查,返回进程池状态。
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```json
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{
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"status": "ok",
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"version": "5.0.0",
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"jsPool": { "total": 20, "idle": 18, "busy": 2, "queued": 0 },
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"pythonPool": { "total": 20, "idle": 20, "busy": 0, "queued": 0 }
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}
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```
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### 响应格式
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成功:
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```json
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{
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"success": true,
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"data": {
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"codeReturn": { "result": 3 },
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"log": "console.log 输出内容"
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}
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}
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```
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失败:
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```json
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{
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"success": false,
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"message": "错误信息"
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}
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```
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## 环境变量
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### 服务配置
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| 变量 | 说明 | 默认值 |
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|------|------|--------|
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| `SANDBOX_PORT` | 服务端口 | `3000` |
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| `SANDBOX_TOKEN` | Bearer Token 认证密钥 | 空(不鉴权) |
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### 进程池
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| 变量 | 说明 | 默认值 |
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|------|------|--------|
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| `SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE` | 每种语言的 worker 进程数 | `20` |
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### 资源限制
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| 变量 | 说明 | 默认值 |
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|------|------|--------|
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| `SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT` | 超时上限(ms),请求不可超过此值 | `60000` |
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| `SANDBOX_MAX_MEMORY_MB` | 内存上限(MB) | `256` |
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### 网络请求限制
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| 变量 | 说明 | 默认值 |
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|------|------|--------|
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| `SANDBOX_REQUEST_MAX_COUNT` | 单次执行最大 HTTP 请求数 | `30` |
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| `SANDBOX_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` | 单次 HTTP 请求超时(ms) | `60000` |
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| `SANDBOX_REQUEST_MAX_RESPONSE_MB` | 最大响应体大小(MB) | `10` |
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| `SANDBOX_REQUEST_MAX_BODY_MB` | 最大请求体大小(MB) | `5` |
|
||
|
||
## 项目结构
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
src/
|
||
├── index.ts # 入口:Hono 服务 + 进程池初始化
|
||
├── env.ts # 环境变量校验(zod)
|
||
├── config.ts # 配置导出
|
||
├── types.ts # 类型定义
|
||
├── pool/
|
||
│ ├── process-pool.ts # JS 进程池管理
|
||
│ ├── python-process-pool.ts # Python 进程池管理
|
||
│ ├── worker.ts # JS worker(长驻进程,含安全 shim)
|
||
│ └── worker.py # Python worker(长驻进程,含安全沙箱)
|
||
└── utils/
|
||
└── semaphore.ts # 信号量(通用并发控制)
|
||
|
||
test/
|
||
├── unit/ # 单元测试(进程池、信号量)
|
||
├── integration/ # 集成测试(API 路由)
|
||
├── boundary/ # 边界测试(超时、内存限制)
|
||
├── security/ # 安全测试(沙箱逃逸防护)
|
||
├── compat/ # 兼容性测试(旧版代码格式)
|
||
├── examples/ # 示例测试(常用包)
|
||
└── benchmark/ # 压测脚本
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
## 添加 JS 包
|
||
|
||
沙盒内的 JS 代码通过 `require()` 加载包,但仅允许白名单内的包。
|
||
|
||
### 当前白名单
|
||
|
||
`lodash`、`dayjs`、`moment`、`uuid`、`crypto-js`、`qs`、`url`、`querystring`
|
||
|
||
### 添加新包步骤
|
||
|
||
1. **安装包**:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
cd projects/sandbox
|
||
bun add <package-name>
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
2. **加入白名单**(环境变量 `SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES`):
|
||
|
||
在逗号分隔列表中添加包名:
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES=lodash,dayjs,moment,uuid,crypto-js,qs,url,querystring,your-new-package
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
3. **重新构建 Docker 镜像**。
|
||
|
||
### 注意事项
|
||
|
||
- 只添加纯计算类的包,不要添加有网络/文件系统/子进程能力的包
|
||
- 包会被打入 Docker 镜像,注意体积
|
||
- 网络请求统一走 `SystemHelper.httpRequest()`,不要放行 `axios`、`node-fetch` 等网络库
|
||
|
||
## 添加 Python 包
|
||
|
||
### 当前预装包
|
||
|
||
`numpy`、`pandas`(通过 `requirements.txt` 安装)
|
||
|
||
### 添加新包步骤
|
||
|
||
1. **编辑 `requirements.txt`**:
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
numpy
|
||
pandas
|
||
your-new-package
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
2. **加入白名单**(环境变量 `SANDBOX_PYTHON_ALLOWED_MODULES`):
|
||
|
||
在逗号分隔列表中添加包名。如果新包依赖了黑名单中的模块(如 `os`),标准库路径的间接导入会自动放行,无需额外配置。
|
||
|
||
3. **重新构建 Docker 镜像**。
|
||
|
||
### 注意事项
|
||
|
||
- Python 的模块黑名单通过 `__import__` 拦截实现,只拦截用户代码的直接 import
|
||
- 标准库和第三方包的内部间接 import 不受影响
|
||
- 危险模块(`os`、`sys`、`subprocess`、`socket` 等)始终被拦截
|
||
|
||
## 安全机制
|
||
|
||
### JS
|
||
|
||
- `require()` 白名单,非白名单模块直接拒绝
|
||
- `Bun.spawn`、`Bun.write`、`Bun.serve` 等 API 禁用
|
||
- `Function` 构造器冻结,阻止 `constructor.constructor` 逃逸
|
||
- `process.env` 清理,仅保留必要变量
|
||
- `fetch`、`XMLHttpRequest`、`WebSocket` 禁用
|
||
|
||
### Python
|
||
|
||
- `__import__` 黑名单拦截:用户代码无法 import 危险模块(`os`、`sys`、`subprocess` 等)
|
||
- `exec()`/`eval()` 内的 import 同样被拦截(基于调用栈帧检测)
|
||
- `builtins.__import__` 通过代理对象保护,用户无法覆盖
|
||
- `signal.SIGALRM` 超时保护
|
||
|
||
### 网络
|
||
|
||
- 所有网络请求通过 `httpRequest()` 收口
|
||
- 内网 IP 黑名单:`10.0.0.0/8`、`172.16.0.0/12`、`192.168.0.0/16`、`127.0.0.0/8`、`169.254.0.0/16`
|
||
- 仅允许 `http:` / `https:` 协议
|
||
- 单次执行请求数、响应体大小、超时均有限制
|
||
|
||
## 内置函数
|
||
|
||
### JS(全局可用)
|
||
|
||
| 函数 | 说明 |
|
||
|------|------|
|
||
| `SystemHelper.httpRequest(url, opts?)` | HTTP 请求(opts: `{method, headers, body, timeout}`) |
|
||
|
||
### Python(全局可用)
|
||
|
||
| 函数 | 说明 |
|
||
|------|------|
|
||
| `SystemHelper.httpRequest(url, opts?)` | HTTP 请求(opts: `{method, headers, body, timeout}`) |
|
||
|
||
## 测试
|
||
|
||
```bash
|
||
# 全部测试(332 cases)
|
||
bun run test
|
||
|
||
# 单个文件
|
||
bunx vitest run test/security/security.test.ts
|
||
|
||
# 带详细输出
|
||
bunx vitest run --reporter=verbose
|
||
|
||
# 压测(需先启动服务)
|
||
bash test/benchmark/bench-sandbox.sh
|
||
bash test/benchmark/bench-sandbox-python.sh
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
测试配置:串行执行(`fileParallelism: false`),池大小 1(避免资源竞争)。
|
||
|
||
测试覆盖维度:
|
||
|
||
| 分类 | 文件数 | 用例数 | 说明 |
|
||
|------|--------|--------|------|
|
||
| 单元测试 | 4 | 43 | 进程池生命周期/恢复/健康检查、Semaphore 并发控制 |
|
||
| 集成测试 | 2 | 53 | HTTP API 路由、JS/Python 功能验证 |
|
||
| 安全测试 | 1 | 102 | 模块拦截、逃逸攻击、SSRF 防护、注入攻击 |
|
||
| 边界测试 | 1 | 58 | 空输入、超时、大数据、类型边界 |
|
||
| 兼容性测试 | 2 | 39 | 旧版 JS/Python 代码格式兼容 |
|
||
| 示例测试 | 1 | 31 | 常用场景和第三方包 |
|
||
|
||
详细测试报告见 [`test/README.md`](test/README.md)。
|