Files
FastGPT/projects/sandbox/README.md
T
Archer 6b61359516 feat(sandbox): 重构代码沙盒,支持内置函数和网络请求 (#6479)
* fix(sandbox): 重构代码沙盒,支持内置函数和网络请求 (#6462)

* feat(sandbox): 重写代码沙盒 - Bun + Hono + 统一子进程模型

- 运行时: Node.js → Bun
- HTTP 框架: NestJS + Fastify → Hono
- JS 执行: isolated-vm → Bun 子进程(与 Python 统一)
- 架构: 统一子进程模型,JS 和 Python 共享同一套执行引擎

- SubprocessRunner 基类,JS/Python 各自继承
- ProcessPool 进程池预热(SANDBOX_JS_POOL_SIZE / SANDBOX_PYTHON_POOL_SIZE)
- SystemHelper 命名空间(JS 端保留向后兼容全局函数)
- 临时文件系统隔离 + 路径遍历防护 + 磁盘配额
- 请求级资源限制(timeoutMs / memoryMB / diskMB)

- JS: 原型链冻结 + Bun API 禁用 + Function 构造器注入 safe require(模块白名单)
- Python: 宿主侧正则预检 + __import__ 拦截 + resource 限制

- 移除: @nestjs/*(6个包)、fastify、isolated-vm、node-gyp、reflect-metadata、rxjs
- 新增: hono
- 保留: tiktoken
- 新增用户可用包: lodash、dayjs、axios、moment、uuid、crypto-js、qs

- 67 个测试全部通过(单元测试 + 安全测试 + 集成测试)
- vitest 独立配置,不影响全局

* fix(sandbox): 安全加固 - 扩展 Bun API 封锁、清理 process.env、闭包封装 Python import 拦截

- JS: 扩展 Bun 危险 API 封锁列表(serve/connect/listen/udpSocket/dns/plugin/build/Transpiler)
- JS: 清理 process.env,仅保留沙箱必要变量,防止泄露敏感环境变量
- Python: 用闭包封装 _safe_import,del 掉 _original_import/_make_safe_import/_BLOCKED_MODULES
  防止用户代码恢复原始 __import__
- Dockerfile: 复制 bun.lock 并使用 --frozen-lockfile 确保构建可复现

* fix(sandbox): 将 sandbox 从 pnpm workspace 中移除,独立管理依赖

* fix(sandbox): 从全局 vitest 移除 sandbox 测试,集成测试无 SANDBOX_URL 时跳过

* ci(sandbox): 添加独立测试 workflow,仅 sandbox 代码变更时触发

* refactor(sandbox): 使用 export default 启动方式,与 sandbox_server 保持一致

* fix: sandbox security hardening & comprehensive test suite

Security fixes:
- JS: freeze Function constructor to block constructor.constructor escape
- JS: handle undefined return from main() (serialize as null)
- Python: fix http_request using from-import after __import__ interception
- Python: __import__ whitelist mode blocks exec/eval import bypasses

New tests (223 passing):
- security/escape-attacks: JS/Python escape attack vectors
- security/network-security: IP blacklist, protocol restrictions, httpRequest
- compat/legacy-js: 18 backward compatibility tests
- compat/legacy-python: 21 backward compatibility tests
- boundary: timeout, memory, disk, edge cases
- examples: common user code patterns

* feat(sandbox): env vars for all limits + rewrite README

- Network limits configurable via env: SANDBOX_MAX_REQUESTS, SANDBOX_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE
- Resource upper bounds configurable: SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_MEMORY_MB, SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB
- README: architecture, API docs, env var reference, how to add JS/Python packages, security overview, built-in functions

* refactor(sandbox): extract env.ts with dotenv for typed env loading

- New env.ts: dotenv.config() + typed helpers (str/int/bool)
- config.ts re-exports env for backward compatibility
- index.ts imports env first to ensure .env loaded before anything else

* refactor(sandbox): use zod for env validation and type coercion

- Replace manual parseInt/str helpers with zod schema + coerce
- Invalid env vars now fail fast with formatted error on startup
- dotenv + zod, clean and declarative

* chore(sandbox): remove unused process pool code

- Delete pool.ts and pool.test.ts (pool was never wired into runners)
- Remove PoolConfig/PooledProcess types
- Remove pool env vars from env.ts
- Clean up README

* feat(sandbox): add concurrency limiter with semaphore

- New Semaphore utility for max concurrent subprocess control
- SANDBOX_MAX_CONCURRENCY env var (default 50)
- Excess requests queue instead of spawning unbounded processes
- Health endpoint exposes concurrency stats (current/queued/max)

* test(sandbox): add semaphore tests and expand coverage to 292 cases

- New semaphore.test.ts (11 tests): acquire/release, queuing, FIFO, stats, serial execution
- JS runner: blank code, template literals, primitive returns, more modules, unicode, partial limits
- Python runner: blank code, triple quotes, primitive returns, unicode, null vars, division errors
- JS security: process.exit, globalThis, Symbol.unscopables, Proxy, dynamic import, path traversal
- Python security: pickle/multiprocessing/threading/ctypes/signal, exec bypass, __subclasses__
- Escape attacks: type() class creation, __builtins__ tampering, getattr access
- Boundary: long vars, special JSON chars, float precision, big ints, circular refs, Promise.reject

* test(sandbox): test-master review - add 31 tests, coverage report

- base-runner.test.ts (10): BaseRunner precheck, temp dir, semaphore integration
- semaphore-race.test.ts (5): race conditions, rapid acquire/release, stress test
- coverage-gaps.test.ts (16): security coverage gaps found during review
- REVIEW-REPORT.md: full test audit report

Total: 323 passed, 0 failed

* fix(sandbox): address PR #6439 review issues

Security fixes:
- Intercept Python builtins.open(), restrict file access to sandbox tmpdir
- Remove unused pool.ts, warmup.mjs, warmup.py (security risk)
- Fix DNS rebinding TOCTOU: use resolved IP for HTTP connections
- Fix symlink path traversal: use realpath instead of normpath
- Add try/finally cleanup for __import__ hook

Robustness:
- Add __SANDBOX_RESULT__ prefix to stdout parsing, prevent user output interference
- Fix disk quota tracking: deduct old file size on overwrite
- Add __import__() pattern scanning in Python precheck

Tests:
- Fix eval+__import__ test assertion (accept both catch and fail paths)

All 323 tests passing.

* fix(sandbox): remove warmup scripts COPY from Dockerfile

* docs(sandbox): add technical design document

* feat(sandbox): configurable module allowlist/blocklist via env vars

- SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES: JS require whitelist (comma-separated)
- SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES: Python import blacklist (comma-separated)
- Defaults unchanged, fully backward compatible

* fix(sandbox): 修复多个安全漏洞

1. Python HTTPS DNS rebinding: HTTPS 请求现在也使用 resolved IP 发起连接
2. Python __import__ hook 恢复漏洞: 移除 finally 块中恢复原始 __import__ 的代码
3. Python 内部变量泄露: 用户代码执行前删除 _os, _socket 等内部模块引用
4. JS process 危险 API: 禁用 process.binding/dlopen/kill/chdir 等,冻结 process.env
5. Python open() fd 绕过: 阻止通过整数文件描述符绕过路径检查
6. API 输入校验: 使用 zod schema 校验请求体,限制代码大小 1MB
7. 无认证警告: SANDBOX_TOKEN 未设置时输出生产环境警告

新增 security-fixes.test.ts 包含所有修复的回归测试

* test: consolidate security tests + add integration test suite

- Merge 6 security test files into 1 consolidated security.test.ts (109 tests)
  - JS/Python module interception (precheck + runtime)
  - JS escape attacks (prototype, constructor, Reflect, globalThis)
  - Python escape attacks (__import__ hook, exec/eval, internal vars, __subclasses__)
  - SSRF protection (private IPs, cloud metadata, file protocol)
  - File system isolation (path traversal, fd, disk quota)
  - Variable injection attacks
  - API input validation

- Add black-box integration test suite functional.test.ts (56 tests)
  - Basic operations (math, string, array, JSON, regex, Date, Promise, Map/Set)
  - Variable passing (string, number, complex objects, empty, multiple)
  - Whitelisted modules (crypto-js, moment, lodash)
  - SystemHelper/system_helper (fs, delay, strToBase64, httpRequest)
  - Error handling (syntax, runtime, undefined var, timeout)
  - Network requests (GET, POST)
  - Complex scenarios (CSV pipeline, recursion, class definition)

- Remove 34 duplicate test cases across merged files
- Total: 363 passed, 8 skipped (integration API tests need server)

* fix(sandbox): z.record() zod v4 compatibility - add key type param

* feat(sandbox): add .env.template with all config options and comments

* refactor(sandbox): remove disk write support and temp filesystem

* test(sandbox): remove all fs-related tests and add test case inventory

- Remove fs read/write tests from unit, integration, boundary, examples
- Remove path traversal, absolute path, open fd, builtins.open tests from security
- Add comprehensive test/case.md with all 344 test cases categorized
- All tests pass: 344 passed, 8 skipped, 0 failed

* feat(sandbox): add GET /sandbox/modules API to list available packages and builtins

* test(sandbox): add unit tests for GET /sandbox/modules API

* refactor(test): rewrite api.test.ts to use app.request() - no external server needed

* feat(sandbox): validate SANDBOX_TOKEN charset in env schema (ASCII printable only)

* chore(sandbox): remove DESIGN.md and package-lock.json from PR

* feat(sandbox): replace spawn-per-request with process pool architecture

- Add ProcessPool (JS) and PythonProcessPool with long-lived worker processes
- Workers communicate via stdin/stdout line-based JSON protocol
- Pool size configurable via SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE env var (default 20)
- Auto-respawn workers on crash
- Semaphore-based queueing when requests exceed pool size

Performance gains (simple functions):
- JS: 22 QPS → 1,328 QPS (60x improvement)
- Python: 14.7 QPS → 3,395 QPS (231x improvement)

- Fix import.meta.dir compatibility for vitest (Node) environments
- Export poolReady promise for test initialization
- Add benchmark scripts to test/benchmark/
- All 354 tests passing (12 test files)

* chore(sandbox): clean up unused files, update README with pool architecture

- Remove test/REVIEW-REPORT.md, test/case.md, test/benchmark.ts (obsolete)
- Rewrite README: pool architecture diagram, performance benchmarks,
  SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE config, project structure, health endpoint format

* fix(sandbox): 修复进程池超时后 worker respawn 竞态条件

根因:超时 kill worker 后,exit 事件是异步的,release() 先执行时
worker 还在列表里,死 worker 被放回 idle 池,后续请求发给死进程。

修复:
- 超时回调中先 removeWorker 再 kill,防止 release 归还死 worker
- removeWorker 返回 bool,exit 事件中避免重复 respawn
- 超时回调主动触发 spawnWorker 补充池
- release 检查 worker 是否仍在池中
- spawnWorker 完成时检查 waitQueue 直接分配

* fix: security hardening & test migration to process pool

- JS worker: harden process object (kill/chdir/env freeze/binding/dlopen)
- Python worker: stack-frame based __import__ hook to block exec/eval bypass
- Python worker: BuiltinsProxy to prevent __import__ override via builtins module
- Python worker: restricted __builtins__ dict in exec_globals (no internal refs)
- Python worker: restore __import__ before each execution
- Migrate all 9 test files from JsRunner/PythonRunner to ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool
- Configure vitest for serial execution (pool size=1, fileParallelism: false)
- Fix security test assertion for builtins tampering (success=true with escaped=false)
- All 102 security tests passing

* docs(sandbox): update README with accurate benchmark data, remove non-existent features

- Update performance table with latest benchmark results (JS 1414 QPS, Python 4247 QPS)
- Remove SANDBOX_DISK_MB/SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB env vars (not implemented)
- Remove SystemHelper.fs.* / system_helper.fs.* docs (not implemented in workers)
- Fix security section to match actual implementation
- Update test count to 351

* refactor(sandbox): remove legacy runner/sandbox/template code

- Delete src/runner/ (base.ts, js-runner.ts, python-runner.ts)
- Delete src/sandbox/ (js-template.ts, python-template.ts, network-config.ts)
- Delete test/unit/js-runner.test.ts, test/unit/python-runner.test.ts
- Keep src/utils/semaphore.ts (generic utility, has its own tests)
- Update README project structure and test count (297 cases)

All functionality is now in src/pool/ (process-pool architecture).
297 tests passing, 0 failures.

* test(sandbox): add process pool lifecycle/respawn/concurrency tests

- ProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, worker crash respawn, timeout respawn,
  pool-full queuing, concurrent crash isolation
- PythonProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, timeout respawn, queuing
- 14 new test cases, total 311 passing

* fix(sandbox): ping/pong health check, replace httpbin.org with baidu.com

- Worker health check: send actual ping message and verify pong response
  instead of only checking stdin.writable (detects stuck workers)
- JS worker.ts: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'}
- Python worker.py: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'}
- ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool: rewrite pingWorker to send ping,
  wait for pong with timeout, replace worker on failure
- Replace all httpbin.org URLs with www.baidu.com in tests
  (httpbin.org unreachable from China/Sealos Devbox)
- Add 4 new health check tests (ping/pong for JS and Python pools)
- All 318 tests passing, 0 failures

* docs: add test report (test/README.md) and update README testing section

- test/README.md: detailed report with 315 passed / 3 skipped / 0 failed
- README.md: updated test section with coverage dimensions table and link to report

* docs: add functional test cases checklist (110 cases)

* fix(sandbox): fix Dockerfile Python env and import detection

1. Dockerfile: Remove broken multi-stage Python 3.11 copy.
   - The previous approach copied python3 binary from python:3.11-alpine
     but missed libpython3.11.so.1.0, causing Python pool init failure.
   - Now uses system Python from apk and installs pip packages directly.

2. worker.py: Fix false positive import blocking for third-party packages.
   - numpy/pandas were blocked because their internal 'import os' was
     detected as user-initiated (full stack scan found user code frames).
   - Changed to check only the direct caller frame: if the import comes
     from site-packages (third-party lib internals), allow it.
   - Direct user imports of blocked modules are still properly rejected.

* fix(sandbox): block dynamic import() and restrict file system access

Security fixes found during deep review:

1. JS: Block import() dynamic imports that bypass require whitelist.
   - import('fs') could read arbitrary files on the container.
   - Added static regex check to reject code containing import().

2. Python: Restrict open() to prevent user code from reading files.
   - open('/etc/passwd') was accessible from user code.
   - Added _restricted_open() that checks caller frame: only allows
     stdlib/site-packages internal calls, blocks user code (<string>).

3. Python: Remove duplicate return statement in _safe_import.

All 315 tests pass (3 skipped).

* test(sandbox): add regression tests for import() and open() security fixes

- JS: import('fs'), import('child_process'), import('os') blocked
- JS: string containing 'import' not false-positive
- Python: open('/etc/passwd'), open('/proc/self/environ'), open('/tmp/evil.txt', 'w') blocked
- Python: numpy internal open() not affected (conditional on numpy availability)

Total: 322 passed | 3 skipped (was 315 passed)

* docs(sandbox): rewrite sandbox documentation with JS + Python coverage

- Add Python language support documentation
- Add httpRequest/http_request function docs
- Add available modules list (JS whitelist + Python safe modules)
- Add security restrictions section
- Add practical examples (data processing, date calc, webhook signing)
- Add JS/Python function name mapping table

* docs(sandbox): use SystemHelper/system_helper for built-in functions

Direct calls (countToken, delay, etc.) are deprecated (kept for compat).
All examples now use SystemHelper.xxx() / system_helper.xxx().

* docs(sandbox): Python only show named-params style as recommended

* feat(sandbox): unify Python SystemHelper API with camelCase aliases

- Add camelCase aliases to Python SystemHelper: countToken, strToBase64,
  createHmac, httpRequest (matching JS API exactly)
- Update docs to use SystemHelper uniformly for both JS and Python
- snake_case methods (count_token, etc.) still work for backward compat

* feat(sandbox): add matplotlib and increase HTTP timeout to 60s

- Add matplotlib to Python dependencies
- Increase HTTP request timeout from 10s to 60s (both JS and Python)
- Update docs accordingly

* docs(sandbox): split docs for old/new sandbox versions

- sandbox.mdx → '代码运行(旧版)' for FastGPT ≤ 4.14.7 (URL unchanged)
- sandbox-v5.mdx → '代码运行' for FastGPT ≥ 4.14.8
- Both pages cross-link to each other
- meta.json updated: sandbox-v5 listed before sandbox

* docs: rename old sandbox doc to 代码运行(弃)

* refactor(sandbox): remove SANDBOX_TIMEOUT, use SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT as unified timeout

* fix(sandbox): add build dependencies for matplotlib in Dockerfile

* refactor(sandbox): migrate Python from blocklist to allowlist for module control

- Change SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES to SANDBOX_PYTHON_ALLOWED_MODULES
- Update Python worker to use allowlist instead of blocklist
- Add comprehensive safe module list: math, json, datetime, numpy, pandas, etc.
- Improve error message: 'Module X is not in the allowlist'
- Consistent with JS allowlist approach for better security

* fix(sandbox): add _strptime to allowlist and update test assertions

- Add _strptime module (required by datetime.strptime)
- Update test assertions for Python module import errors
- All 325 tests now pass (322 passed, 3 skipped)

* fix(docs): center SVG icon in size-5 container on medium screens

* docs(sandbox): simplify built-in functions and improve module documentation

- Remove delay, countToken, strToBase64, createHmac functions (keep only httpRequest)
- Convert Python module list to table format (10 tables by category)
- Reorganize usage examples with collapsible sections (JS and Python)
- Fix icon alignment in desktop/mobile sidebar navigation
- All 325 tests passing

---------

Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev>
Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai>
Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local>

* perf: code sandbox

* update action

* Update projects/app/src/components/core/chat/ChatContainer/ChatBox/index.tsx

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* update timeout

* update memory limit function

* sandbox

* perf: process poll

* env template

* feat: code tip

* fix: code sandbox error tip

* update memory limit fn

* update memory limit fn

* fix: test

* fix: test

* fix: sandbox

---------

Co-authored-by: Archer <archer@fastgpt.io>
Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev>
Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai>
Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-28 12:36:59 +08:00

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# FastGPT Code Sandbox
基于 Bun + Hono 的代码执行沙盒,支持 JS 和 Python。采用进程池架构,预热长驻 worker 进程,通过 stdin/stdout JSON 协议通信,消除每次请求的进程启动开销。
## 架构
```
HTTP Request → Hono Server → Process Pool → Worker (long-lived) → Result
┌──────────────┐
│ JS Workers │ bun run worker.ts (×N)
│ Py Workers │ python3 worker.py (×N)
└──────────────┘
stdin: JSON task → stdout: JSON result
```
- **进程池**:启动时预热 N 个 worker 进程(默认 20),请求到达时直接分配空闲 worker,执行完归还池中
- **JS 执行**Bun worker 进程 + 安全 shim(禁用 Bun API、冻结 Function 构造器、require 白名单)
- **Python 执行**python3 worker 进程 + `__import__` 拦截 + resource 资源限制
- **网络请求**:统一通过 `SystemHelper.httpRequest()` / `system_helper.http_request()` 收口,内置 SSRF 防护
- **并发控制**:请求数超过池大小时自动排队,worker 崩溃自动重启补充
## 性能
进程池 vs 旧版 spawn-per-request 对比(SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE=20):
| 场景 | 旧版 QPS / P50 | 进程池 QPS / P50 | 提升 |
|------|----------------|------------------|------|
| JS 简单函数 (c50) | 22 / 1,938ms | 1,414 / 7ms | **64x** |
| JS IO 500ms (c50) | 22 / 2,107ms | 38 / 1,005ms | 1.7x |
| JS 高 CPU (c10) | 9 / 1,079ms | 12 / 796ms | 1.3x |
| JS 高内存 (c10) | — | 13 / 787ms | — |
| Python 简单函数 (c50) | 14.7 / 2,897ms | 4,247 / 4ms | **289x** |
| Python IO 500ms (c50) | 14.2 / 3,066ms | 38 / 1,003ms | 2.7x |
| Python 高 CPU (c10) | 3.1 / 2,845ms | 4 / 2,191ms | 1.3x |
| Python 高内存 (c10) | — | 11 / 893ms | — |
资源占用(20+20 workers):空闲 ~1.5GB RSS,压测峰值 ~2GB RSS。
## 快速开始
```bash
# 安装依赖
bun install
# 开发运行
bun run src/index.ts
# 运行测试
bun run test
```
## Docker
```bash
# 构建
docker build -f projects/sandbox/Dockerfile -t fastgpt-sandbox .
# 运行
docker run -p 3000:3000 \
-e SANDBOX_TOKEN=your-secret-token \
-e SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE=20 \
fastgpt-sandbox
```
## API
### `POST /sandbox/js`
执行 JavaScript 代码。
```json
{
"code": "async function main(variables) {\n return { result: variables.a + variables.b }\n}",
"variables": { "a": 1, "b": 2 }
}
```
### `POST /sandbox/python`
执行 Python 代码。
```json
{
"code": "def main(variables):\n return {'result': variables['a'] + variables['b']}",
"variables": { "a": 1, "b": 2 }
}
```
### `GET /health`
健康检查,返回进程池状态。
```json
{
"status": "ok",
"version": "5.0.0",
"jsPool": { "total": 20, "idle": 18, "busy": 2, "queued": 0 },
"pythonPool": { "total": 20, "idle": 20, "busy": 0, "queued": 0 }
}
```
### 响应格式
成功:
```json
{
"success": true,
"data": {
"codeReturn": { "result": 3 },
"log": "console.log 输出内容"
}
}
```
失败:
```json
{
"success": false,
"message": "错误信息"
}
```
## 环境变量
### 服务配置
| 变量 | 说明 | 默认值 |
|------|------|--------|
| `SANDBOX_PORT` | 服务端口 | `3000` |
| `SANDBOX_TOKEN` | Bearer Token 认证密钥 | 空(不鉴权) |
### 进程池
| 变量 | 说明 | 默认值 |
|------|------|--------|
| `SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE` | 每种语言的 worker 进程数 | `20` |
### 资源限制
| 变量 | 说明 | 默认值 |
|------|------|--------|
| `SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT` | 超时上限(ms),请求不可超过此值 | `60000` |
| `SANDBOX_MAX_MEMORY_MB` | 内存上限(MB | `256` |
### 网络请求限制
| 变量 | 说明 | 默认值 |
|------|------|--------|
| `SANDBOX_REQUEST_MAX_COUNT` | 单次执行最大 HTTP 请求数 | `30` |
| `SANDBOX_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` | 单次 HTTP 请求超时(ms) | `60000` |
| `SANDBOX_REQUEST_MAX_RESPONSE_MB` | 最大响应体大小(MB | `10` |
| `SANDBOX_REQUEST_MAX_BODY_MB` | 最大请求体大小(MB | `5` |
## 项目结构
```
src/
├── index.ts # 入口:Hono 服务 + 进程池初始化
├── env.ts # 环境变量校验(zod)
├── config.ts # 配置导出
├── types.ts # 类型定义
├── pool/
│ ├── process-pool.ts # JS 进程池管理
│ ├── python-process-pool.ts # Python 进程池管理
│ ├── worker.ts # JS worker(长驻进程,含安全 shim
│ └── worker.py # Python worker(长驻进程,含安全沙箱)
└── utils/
└── semaphore.ts # 信号量(通用并发控制)
test/
├── unit/ # 单元测试(进程池、信号量)
├── integration/ # 集成测试(API 路由)
├── boundary/ # 边界测试(超时、内存限制)
├── security/ # 安全测试(沙箱逃逸防护)
├── compat/ # 兼容性测试(旧版代码格式)
├── examples/ # 示例测试(常用包)
└── benchmark/ # 压测脚本
```
## 添加 JS 包
沙盒内的 JS 代码通过 `require()` 加载包,但仅允许白名单内的包。
### 当前白名单
`lodash``dayjs``moment``uuid``crypto-js``qs``url``querystring`
### 添加新包步骤
1. **安装包**
```bash
cd projects/sandbox
bun add <package-name>
```
2. **加入白名单**(环境变量 `SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES`):
在逗号分隔列表中添加包名:
```bash
SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES=lodash,dayjs,moment,uuid,crypto-js,qs,url,querystring,your-new-package
```
3. **重新构建 Docker 镜像**
### 注意事项
- 只添加纯计算类的包,不要添加有网络/文件系统/子进程能力的包
- 包会被打入 Docker 镜像,注意体积
- 网络请求统一走 `SystemHelper.httpRequest()`,不要放行 `axios``node-fetch` 等网络库
## 添加 Python 包
### 当前预装包
`numpy``pandas`(通过 `requirements.txt` 安装)
### 添加新包步骤
1. **编辑 `requirements.txt`**
```
numpy
pandas
your-new-package
```
2. **加入白名单**(环境变量 `SANDBOX_PYTHON_ALLOWED_MODULES`):
在逗号分隔列表中添加包名。如果新包依赖了黑名单中的模块(如 `os`),标准库路径的间接导入会自动放行,无需额外配置。
3. **重新构建 Docker 镜像**
### 注意事项
- Python 的模块黑名单通过 `__import__` 拦截实现,只拦截用户代码的直接 import
- 标准库和第三方包的内部间接 import 不受影响
- 危险模块(`os``sys``subprocess``socket` 等)始终被拦截
## 安全机制
### JS
- `require()` 白名单,非白名单模块直接拒绝
- `Bun.spawn``Bun.write``Bun.serve` 等 API 禁用
- `Function` 构造器冻结,阻止 `constructor.constructor` 逃逸
- `process.env` 清理,仅保留必要变量
- `fetch``XMLHttpRequest``WebSocket` 禁用
### Python
- `__import__` 黑名单拦截:用户代码无法 import 危险模块(`os``sys``subprocess` 等)
- `exec()`/`eval()` 内的 import 同样被拦截(基于调用栈帧检测)
- `builtins.__import__` 通过代理对象保护,用户无法覆盖
- `signal.SIGALRM` 超时保护
### 网络
- 所有网络请求通过 `httpRequest()` 收口
- 内网 IP 黑名单:`10.0.0.0/8``172.16.0.0/12``192.168.0.0/16``127.0.0.0/8``169.254.0.0/16`
- 仅允许 `http:` / `https:` 协议
- 单次执行请求数、响应体大小、超时均有限制
## 内置函数
### JS(全局可用)
| 函数 | 说明 |
|------|------|
| `SystemHelper.httpRequest(url, opts?)` | HTTP 请求(opts: `{method, headers, body, timeout}` |
### Python(全局可用)
| 函数 | 说明 |
|------|------|
| `SystemHelper.httpRequest(url, opts?)` | HTTP 请求(opts: `{method, headers, body, timeout}` |
## 测试
```bash
# 全部测试(332 cases
bun run test
# 单个文件
bunx vitest run test/security/security.test.ts
# 带详细输出
bunx vitest run --reporter=verbose
# 压测(需先启动服务)
bash test/benchmark/bench-sandbox.sh
bash test/benchmark/bench-sandbox-python.sh
```
测试配置:串行执行(`fileParallelism: false`),池大小 1(避免资源竞争)。
测试覆盖维度:
| 分类 | 文件数 | 用例数 | 说明 |
|------|--------|--------|------|
| 单元测试 | 4 | 43 | 进程池生命周期/恢复/健康检查、Semaphore 并发控制 |
| 集成测试 | 2 | 53 | HTTP API 路由、JS/Python 功能验证 |
| 安全测试 | 1 | 102 | 模块拦截、逃逸攻击、SSRF 防护、注入攻击 |
| 边界测试 | 1 | 58 | 空输入、超时、大数据、类型边界 |
| 兼容性测试 | 2 | 39 | 旧版 JS/Python 代码格式兼容 |
| 示例测试 | 1 | 31 | 常用场景和第三方包 |
详细测试报告见 [`test/README.md`](test/README.md)。