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* fix(sandbox): 重构代码沙盒,支持内置函数和网络请求 (#6462) * feat(sandbox): 重写代码沙盒 - Bun + Hono + 统一子进程模型 - 运行时: Node.js → Bun - HTTP 框架: NestJS + Fastify → Hono - JS 执行: isolated-vm → Bun 子进程(与 Python 统一) - 架构: 统一子进程模型,JS 和 Python 共享同一套执行引擎 - SubprocessRunner 基类,JS/Python 各自继承 - ProcessPool 进程池预热(SANDBOX_JS_POOL_SIZE / SANDBOX_PYTHON_POOL_SIZE) - SystemHelper 命名空间(JS 端保留向后兼容全局函数) - 临时文件系统隔离 + 路径遍历防护 + 磁盘配额 - 请求级资源限制(timeoutMs / memoryMB / diskMB) - JS: 原型链冻结 + Bun API 禁用 + Function 构造器注入 safe require(模块白名单) - Python: 宿主侧正则预检 + __import__ 拦截 + resource 限制 - 移除: @nestjs/*(6个包)、fastify、isolated-vm、node-gyp、reflect-metadata、rxjs - 新增: hono - 保留: tiktoken - 新增用户可用包: lodash、dayjs、axios、moment、uuid、crypto-js、qs - 67 个测试全部通过(单元测试 + 安全测试 + 集成测试) - vitest 独立配置,不影响全局 * fix(sandbox): 安全加固 - 扩展 Bun API 封锁、清理 process.env、闭包封装 Python import 拦截 - JS: 扩展 Bun 危险 API 封锁列表(serve/connect/listen/udpSocket/dns/plugin/build/Transpiler) - JS: 清理 process.env,仅保留沙箱必要变量,防止泄露敏感环境变量 - Python: 用闭包封装 _safe_import,del 掉 _original_import/_make_safe_import/_BLOCKED_MODULES 防止用户代码恢复原始 __import__ - Dockerfile: 复制 bun.lock 并使用 --frozen-lockfile 确保构建可复现 * fix(sandbox): 将 sandbox 从 pnpm workspace 中移除,独立管理依赖 * fix(sandbox): 从全局 vitest 移除 sandbox 测试,集成测试无 SANDBOX_URL 时跳过 * ci(sandbox): 添加独立测试 workflow,仅 sandbox 代码变更时触发 * refactor(sandbox): 使用 export default 启动方式,与 sandbox_server 保持一致 * fix: sandbox security hardening & comprehensive test suite Security fixes: - JS: freeze Function constructor to block constructor.constructor escape - JS: handle undefined return from main() (serialize as null) - Python: fix http_request using from-import after __import__ interception - Python: __import__ whitelist mode blocks exec/eval import bypasses New tests (223 passing): - security/escape-attacks: JS/Python escape attack vectors - security/network-security: IP blacklist, protocol restrictions, httpRequest - compat/legacy-js: 18 backward compatibility tests - compat/legacy-python: 21 backward compatibility tests - boundary: timeout, memory, disk, edge cases - examples: common user code patterns * feat(sandbox): env vars for all limits + rewrite README - Network limits configurable via env: SANDBOX_MAX_REQUESTS, SANDBOX_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE - Resource upper bounds configurable: SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_MEMORY_MB, SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB - README: architecture, API docs, env var reference, how to add JS/Python packages, security overview, built-in functions * refactor(sandbox): extract env.ts with dotenv for typed env loading - New env.ts: dotenv.config() + typed helpers (str/int/bool) - config.ts re-exports env for backward compatibility - index.ts imports env first to ensure .env loaded before anything else * refactor(sandbox): use zod for env validation and type coercion - Replace manual parseInt/str helpers with zod schema + coerce - Invalid env vars now fail fast with formatted error on startup - dotenv + zod, clean and declarative * chore(sandbox): remove unused process pool code - Delete pool.ts and pool.test.ts (pool was never wired into runners) - Remove PoolConfig/PooledProcess types - Remove pool env vars from env.ts - Clean up README * feat(sandbox): add concurrency limiter with semaphore - New Semaphore utility for max concurrent subprocess control - SANDBOX_MAX_CONCURRENCY env var (default 50) - Excess requests queue instead of spawning unbounded processes - Health endpoint exposes concurrency stats (current/queued/max) * test(sandbox): add semaphore tests and expand coverage to 292 cases - New semaphore.test.ts (11 tests): acquire/release, queuing, FIFO, stats, serial execution - JS runner: blank code, template literals, primitive returns, more modules, unicode, partial limits - Python runner: blank code, triple quotes, primitive returns, unicode, null vars, division errors - JS security: process.exit, globalThis, Symbol.unscopables, Proxy, dynamic import, path traversal - Python security: pickle/multiprocessing/threading/ctypes/signal, exec bypass, __subclasses__ - Escape attacks: type() class creation, __builtins__ tampering, getattr access - Boundary: long vars, special JSON chars, float precision, big ints, circular refs, Promise.reject * test(sandbox): test-master review - add 31 tests, coverage report - base-runner.test.ts (10): BaseRunner precheck, temp dir, semaphore integration - semaphore-race.test.ts (5): race conditions, rapid acquire/release, stress test - coverage-gaps.test.ts (16): security coverage gaps found during review - REVIEW-REPORT.md: full test audit report Total: 323 passed, 0 failed * fix(sandbox): address PR #6439 review issues Security fixes: - Intercept Python builtins.open(), restrict file access to sandbox tmpdir - Remove unused pool.ts, warmup.mjs, warmup.py (security risk) - Fix DNS rebinding TOCTOU: use resolved IP for HTTP connections - Fix symlink path traversal: use realpath instead of normpath - Add try/finally cleanup for __import__ hook Robustness: - Add __SANDBOX_RESULT__ prefix to stdout parsing, prevent user output interference - Fix disk quota tracking: deduct old file size on overwrite - Add __import__() pattern scanning in Python precheck Tests: - Fix eval+__import__ test assertion (accept both catch and fail paths) All 323 tests passing. * fix(sandbox): remove warmup scripts COPY from Dockerfile * docs(sandbox): add technical design document * feat(sandbox): configurable module allowlist/blocklist via env vars - SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES: JS require whitelist (comma-separated) - SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES: Python import blacklist (comma-separated) - Defaults unchanged, fully backward compatible * fix(sandbox): 修复多个安全漏洞 1. Python HTTPS DNS rebinding: HTTPS 请求现在也使用 resolved IP 发起连接 2. Python __import__ hook 恢复漏洞: 移除 finally 块中恢复原始 __import__ 的代码 3. Python 内部变量泄露: 用户代码执行前删除 _os, _socket 等内部模块引用 4. JS process 危险 API: 禁用 process.binding/dlopen/kill/chdir 等,冻结 process.env 5. Python open() fd 绕过: 阻止通过整数文件描述符绕过路径检查 6. API 输入校验: 使用 zod schema 校验请求体,限制代码大小 1MB 7. 无认证警告: SANDBOX_TOKEN 未设置时输出生产环境警告 新增 security-fixes.test.ts 包含所有修复的回归测试 * test: consolidate security tests + add integration test suite - Merge 6 security test files into 1 consolidated security.test.ts (109 tests) - JS/Python module interception (precheck + runtime) - JS escape attacks (prototype, constructor, Reflect, globalThis) - Python escape attacks (__import__ hook, exec/eval, internal vars, __subclasses__) - SSRF protection (private IPs, cloud metadata, file protocol) - File system isolation (path traversal, fd, disk quota) - Variable injection attacks - API input validation - Add black-box integration test suite functional.test.ts (56 tests) - Basic operations (math, string, array, JSON, regex, Date, Promise, Map/Set) - Variable passing (string, number, complex objects, empty, multiple) - Whitelisted modules (crypto-js, moment, lodash) - SystemHelper/system_helper (fs, delay, strToBase64, httpRequest) - Error handling (syntax, runtime, undefined var, timeout) - Network requests (GET, POST) - Complex scenarios (CSV pipeline, recursion, class definition) - Remove 34 duplicate test cases across merged files - Total: 363 passed, 8 skipped (integration API tests need server) * fix(sandbox): z.record() zod v4 compatibility - add key type param * feat(sandbox): add .env.template with all config options and comments * refactor(sandbox): remove disk write support and temp filesystem * test(sandbox): remove all fs-related tests and add test case inventory - Remove fs read/write tests from unit, integration, boundary, examples - Remove path traversal, absolute path, open fd, builtins.open tests from security - Add comprehensive test/case.md with all 344 test cases categorized - All tests pass: 344 passed, 8 skipped, 0 failed * feat(sandbox): add GET /sandbox/modules API to list available packages and builtins * test(sandbox): add unit tests for GET /sandbox/modules API * refactor(test): rewrite api.test.ts to use app.request() - no external server needed * feat(sandbox): validate SANDBOX_TOKEN charset in env schema (ASCII printable only) * chore(sandbox): remove DESIGN.md and package-lock.json from PR * feat(sandbox): replace spawn-per-request with process pool architecture - Add ProcessPool (JS) and PythonProcessPool with long-lived worker processes - Workers communicate via stdin/stdout line-based JSON protocol - Pool size configurable via SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE env var (default 20) - Auto-respawn workers on crash - Semaphore-based queueing when requests exceed pool size Performance gains (simple functions): - JS: 22 QPS → 1,328 QPS (60x improvement) - Python: 14.7 QPS → 3,395 QPS (231x improvement) - Fix import.meta.dir compatibility for vitest (Node) environments - Export poolReady promise for test initialization - Add benchmark scripts to test/benchmark/ - All 354 tests passing (12 test files) * chore(sandbox): clean up unused files, update README with pool architecture - Remove test/REVIEW-REPORT.md, test/case.md, test/benchmark.ts (obsolete) - Rewrite README: pool architecture diagram, performance benchmarks, SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE config, project structure, health endpoint format * fix(sandbox): 修复进程池超时后 worker respawn 竞态条件 根因:超时 kill worker 后,exit 事件是异步的,release() 先执行时 worker 还在列表里,死 worker 被放回 idle 池,后续请求发给死进程。 修复: - 超时回调中先 removeWorker 再 kill,防止 release 归还死 worker - removeWorker 返回 bool,exit 事件中避免重复 respawn - 超时回调主动触发 spawnWorker 补充池 - release 检查 worker 是否仍在池中 - spawnWorker 完成时检查 waitQueue 直接分配 * fix: security hardening & test migration to process pool - JS worker: harden process object (kill/chdir/env freeze/binding/dlopen) - Python worker: stack-frame based __import__ hook to block exec/eval bypass - Python worker: BuiltinsProxy to prevent __import__ override via builtins module - Python worker: restricted __builtins__ dict in exec_globals (no internal refs) - Python worker: restore __import__ before each execution - Migrate all 9 test files from JsRunner/PythonRunner to ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool - Configure vitest for serial execution (pool size=1, fileParallelism: false) - Fix security test assertion for builtins tampering (success=true with escaped=false) - All 102 security tests passing * docs(sandbox): update README with accurate benchmark data, remove non-existent features - Update performance table with latest benchmark results (JS 1414 QPS, Python 4247 QPS) - Remove SANDBOX_DISK_MB/SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB env vars (not implemented) - Remove SystemHelper.fs.* / system_helper.fs.* docs (not implemented in workers) - Fix security section to match actual implementation - Update test count to 351 * refactor(sandbox): remove legacy runner/sandbox/template code - Delete src/runner/ (base.ts, js-runner.ts, python-runner.ts) - Delete src/sandbox/ (js-template.ts, python-template.ts, network-config.ts) - Delete test/unit/js-runner.test.ts, test/unit/python-runner.test.ts - Keep src/utils/semaphore.ts (generic utility, has its own tests) - Update README project structure and test count (297 cases) All functionality is now in src/pool/ (process-pool architecture). 297 tests passing, 0 failures. * test(sandbox): add process pool lifecycle/respawn/concurrency tests - ProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, worker crash respawn, timeout respawn, pool-full queuing, concurrent crash isolation - PythonProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, timeout respawn, queuing - 14 new test cases, total 311 passing * fix(sandbox): ping/pong health check, replace httpbin.org with baidu.com - Worker health check: send actual ping message and verify pong response instead of only checking stdin.writable (detects stuck workers) - JS worker.ts: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - Python worker.py: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool: rewrite pingWorker to send ping, wait for pong with timeout, replace worker on failure - Replace all httpbin.org URLs with www.baidu.com in tests (httpbin.org unreachable from China/Sealos Devbox) - Add 4 new health check tests (ping/pong for JS and Python pools) - All 318 tests passing, 0 failures * docs: add test report (test/README.md) and update README testing section - test/README.md: detailed report with 315 passed / 3 skipped / 0 failed - README.md: updated test section with coverage dimensions table and link to report * docs: add functional test cases checklist (110 cases) * fix(sandbox): fix Dockerfile Python env and import detection 1. Dockerfile: Remove broken multi-stage Python 3.11 copy. - The previous approach copied python3 binary from python:3.11-alpine but missed libpython3.11.so.1.0, causing Python pool init failure. - Now uses system Python from apk and installs pip packages directly. 2. worker.py: Fix false positive import blocking for third-party packages. - numpy/pandas were blocked because their internal 'import os' was detected as user-initiated (full stack scan found user code frames). - Changed to check only the direct caller frame: if the import comes from site-packages (third-party lib internals), allow it. - Direct user imports of blocked modules are still properly rejected. * fix(sandbox): block dynamic import() and restrict file system access Security fixes found during deep review: 1. JS: Block import() dynamic imports that bypass require whitelist. - import('fs') could read arbitrary files on the container. - Added static regex check to reject code containing import(). 2. Python: Restrict open() to prevent user code from reading files. - open('/etc/passwd') was accessible from user code. - Added _restricted_open() that checks caller frame: only allows stdlib/site-packages internal calls, blocks user code (<string>). 3. Python: Remove duplicate return statement in _safe_import. All 315 tests pass (3 skipped). * test(sandbox): add regression tests for import() and open() security fixes - JS: import('fs'), import('child_process'), import('os') blocked - JS: string containing 'import' not false-positive - Python: open('/etc/passwd'), open('/proc/self/environ'), open('/tmp/evil.txt', 'w') blocked - Python: numpy internal open() not affected (conditional on numpy availability) Total: 322 passed | 3 skipped (was 315 passed) * docs(sandbox): rewrite sandbox documentation with JS + Python coverage - Add Python language support documentation - Add httpRequest/http_request function docs - Add available modules list (JS whitelist + Python safe modules) - Add security restrictions section - Add practical examples (data processing, date calc, webhook signing) - Add JS/Python function name mapping table * docs(sandbox): use SystemHelper/system_helper for built-in functions Direct calls (countToken, delay, etc.) are deprecated (kept for compat). All examples now use SystemHelper.xxx() / system_helper.xxx(). * docs(sandbox): Python only show named-params style as recommended * feat(sandbox): unify Python SystemHelper API with camelCase aliases - Add camelCase aliases to Python SystemHelper: countToken, strToBase64, createHmac, httpRequest (matching JS API exactly) - Update docs to use SystemHelper uniformly for both JS and Python - snake_case methods (count_token, etc.) still work for backward compat * feat(sandbox): add matplotlib and increase HTTP timeout to 60s - Add matplotlib to Python dependencies - Increase HTTP request timeout from 10s to 60s (both JS and Python) - Update docs accordingly * docs(sandbox): split docs for old/new sandbox versions - sandbox.mdx → '代码运行(旧版)' for FastGPT ≤ 4.14.7 (URL unchanged) - sandbox-v5.mdx → '代码运行' for FastGPT ≥ 4.14.8 - Both pages cross-link to each other - meta.json updated: sandbox-v5 listed before sandbox * docs: rename old sandbox doc to 代码运行(弃) * refactor(sandbox): remove SANDBOX_TIMEOUT, use SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT as unified timeout * fix(sandbox): add build dependencies for matplotlib in Dockerfile * refactor(sandbox): migrate Python from blocklist to allowlist for module control - Change SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES to SANDBOX_PYTHON_ALLOWED_MODULES - Update Python worker to use allowlist instead of blocklist - Add comprehensive safe module list: math, json, datetime, numpy, pandas, etc. - Improve error message: 'Module X is not in the allowlist' - Consistent with JS allowlist approach for better security * fix(sandbox): add _strptime to allowlist and update test assertions - Add _strptime module (required by datetime.strptime) - Update test assertions for Python module import errors - All 325 tests now pass (322 passed, 3 skipped) * fix(docs): center SVG icon in size-5 container on medium screens * docs(sandbox): simplify built-in functions and improve module documentation - Remove delay, countToken, strToBase64, createHmac functions (keep only httpRequest) - Convert Python module list to table format (10 tables by category) - Reorganize usage examples with collapsible sections (JS and Python) - Fix icon alignment in desktop/mobile sidebar navigation - All 325 tests passing --------- Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev> Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai> Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local> * perf: code sandbox * update action * Update projects/app/src/components/core/chat/ChatContainer/ChatBox/index.tsx Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * update timeout * update memory limit function * sandbox * perf: process poll * env template * feat: code tip * fix: code sandbox error tip * update memory limit fn * update memory limit fn * fix: test * fix: test * fix: sandbox --------- Co-authored-by: Archer <archer@fastgpt.io> Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev> Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai> Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local> Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
1772 lines
60 KiB
TypeScript
1772 lines
60 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* 安全测试套件
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*
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* 按功能分类:
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* 1. 模块拦截(JS require/import + Python import 预检与运行时)
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* 2. 逃逸攻击(原型链、Function 构造器、eval/exec、__subclasses__)
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* 3. 网络安全(fetch/XHR/WebSocket 禁用 + SSRF 防护)
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* 4. 文件系统隔离(JS + Python)
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* 5. 变量注入攻击
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* 6. API 输入校验
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* 7. 沙盒环境加固(globalThis/Bun/process 锁定、Error stack、模块污染隔离)
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*/
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import { afterEach, describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
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import { ProcessPool } from '../../src/pool/process-pool';
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import { PythonProcessPool } from '../../src/pool/python-process-pool';
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let jsPool: ProcessPool;
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let pyPool: PythonProcessPool;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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jsPool = new ProcessPool(1);
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await jsPool.init();
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pyPool = new PythonProcessPool(1);
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await pyPool.init();
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await jsPool.shutdown();
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await pyPool.shutdown();
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});
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describe('模块拦截', () => {
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describe('JS', () => {
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const runner = { execute: (args: any) => jsPool.execute(args) };
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it('阻止 require child_process', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { const cp = require('child_process'); return {}; }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(false);
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});
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it('阻止 require fs', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { const fs = require('fs'); return { data: fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd', 'utf-8') }; }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(false);
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});
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it('阻止 require net', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { const net = require('net'); return {}; }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(false);
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});
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it('阻止 require http', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { const http = require('http'); return {}; }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(false);
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});
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it('阻止 require https', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { const https = require('https'); return {}; }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(false);
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});
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it('阻止 require axios', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { const axios = require('axios'); return {}; }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(false);
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});
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it('阻止 require node-fetch', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { const fetch = require('node-fetch'); return {}; }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(false);
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});
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it('Bun.spawn 被禁用', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { try { Bun.spawn(['ls']); return { escaped: true }; } catch { return { escaped: false }; } }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
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});
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it('Bun.spawnSync 被禁用', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { try { Bun.spawnSync(['ls']); return { escaped: true }; } catch { return { escaped: false }; } }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
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});
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it('Bun.serve 被禁用', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { try { Bun.serve({ port: 9999, fetch() { return new Response('hi'); } }); return { escaped: true }; } catch { return { escaped: false }; } }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
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});
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it('Bun.write 被禁用', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { try { await Bun.write('/tmp/evil.txt', 'pwned'); return { escaped: true }; } catch { return { escaped: false }; } }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
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});
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it('process.binding 被禁用', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { try { process.binding('fs'); return { escaped: true }; } catch { return { escaped: false }; } }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
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});
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it('process.dlopen 被禁用', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { return { hasDlopen: typeof process.dlopen === 'function' }; }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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expect(result.data?.codeReturn.hasDlopen).toBe(false);
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});
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it('process._linkedBinding 被禁用', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { return { has: typeof process._linkedBinding === 'function' }; }`,
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variables: {}
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});
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expect(result.success).toBe(true);
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expect(result.data?.codeReturn.has).toBe(false);
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});
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it('process.kill 被禁用', async () => {
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const result = await runner.execute({
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code: `async function main() { return { hasKill: typeof process.kill === 'function' }; }`,
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variables: {}
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});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.hasKill).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('process.chdir 被禁用', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { try { process.chdir('/'); return { escaped: true }; } catch { return { escaped: false }; } }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('Python', () => {
|
||
const runner = { execute: (args: any) => pyPool.execute(args) };
|
||
|
||
// --- 宿主侧预检拦截 ---
|
||
const precheckModules = [
|
||
'os',
|
||
'subprocess',
|
||
'sys',
|
||
'shutil',
|
||
'pickle',
|
||
'multiprocessing',
|
||
'threading',
|
||
'ctypes',
|
||
'signal',
|
||
'gc',
|
||
'tempfile',
|
||
'pathlib',
|
||
'importlib'
|
||
];
|
||
for (const mod of precheckModules) {
|
||
it(`阻止 import ${mod}(预检)`, async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import ${mod}\ndef main(v):\n return {}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
it('阻止 from os import path(预检)', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `from os import path\ndef main(v):\n return {}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('阻止 from subprocess import Popen(预检)', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `from subprocess import Popen\ndef main(v):\n return {}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('阻止 from importlib import import_module(预检)', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `from importlib import import_module\ndef main(v):\n return {}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('阻止 import socket', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import socket\ndef main(v):\n return {}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('阻止 import urllib.request', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import urllib.request\ndef main():\n return {}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('阻止 import http.client', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import http.client\ndef main():\n return {}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('阻止 import requests(预检)', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import requests\ndef main():\n return {}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// --- 运行时 __import__ hook 拦截 ---
|
||
it('运行时动态 __import__("subprocess") 被拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main(v):\n mod = __import__("subprocess")\n return {}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(result.message).toContain('not in the allowlist');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('条件块内 import os 被运行时拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n if True:\n import os\n return {'cwd': os.getcwd()}\n return {}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// --- 安全模块正常使用 ---
|
||
it('允许 import json', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import json\ndef main(v):\n data = json.dumps({"key": "value"})\n return {"data": data}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.data).toBe('{"key": "value"}');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('允许 import math', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import math\ndef main(v):\n return {"pi": round(math.pi, 2)}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.pi).toBe(3.14);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('允许 from datetime import datetime', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `from datetime import datetime\ndef main():\n return {'year': datetime.now().year}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.year).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2024);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('允许 import re', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import re\ndef main():\n m = re.search(r'(\\d+)', 'abc123def')\n return {'match': m.group(1)}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.match).toBe('123');
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('逃逸攻击', () => {
|
||
describe('JS', () => {
|
||
const runner = { execute: (args: any) => jsPool.execute(args) };
|
||
|
||
it('constructor.constructor 无法获取 Function', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { const F = ({}).constructor.constructor; const proc = F('return process')(); return { escaped: true, pid: proc.pid }; }
|
||
catch(e) { return { escaped: false }; }
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
} else {
|
||
expect(result.message).toMatch(/not allowed|Function/i);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('constructor 链逃逸到 Function', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { const F = [].fill.constructor; const fn = new F('return this.process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("id").toString()'); return { escaped: true, result: fn() }; }
|
||
catch(e) { return { escaped: false }; }
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('__proto__ 访问被阻止', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const obj = {}; const proto = obj.__proto__; return { proto: proto === null || proto === undefined || Object.keys(proto).length === 0 }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('原型链污染不影响沙盒安全(子进程隔离)', async () => {
|
||
// Bun 中 __proto__ 赋值可能生效,但子进程隔离保证不影响宿主
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { const obj = {}; obj.__proto__.polluted = true; return { polluted: ({}).polluted === true }; }
|
||
catch(e) { return { polluted: false }; }
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
// 即使子进程内污染成功,也不影响宿主进程
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('eval 无法访问外部作用域', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { const result = eval('typeof process !== "undefined" ? process.env : "no access"'); return { result: typeof result === 'object' ? 'has_env' : result }; }
|
||
catch(e) { return { blocked: true }; }
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('new Function 构造器被 _SafeFunction 拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { const fn = new Function('return process.env'); return { escaped: true }; }
|
||
catch(e) { return { escaped: false }; }
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
// _SafeFunction 可能在用户代码外抛错(success=false),也可能被 catch(escaped=false)
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('Reflect.construct(Function, ...) 被阻止', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { const fn = Reflect.construct(Function, ['return 42']); return { escaped: true }; }
|
||
catch(e) { return { escaped: false }; }
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('Symbol.unscopables 逃逸尝试', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { const obj = { [Symbol.unscopables]: { process: false } }; return { escaped: false }; }
|
||
catch(e) { return { escaped: false }; }
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('Proxy 构造器不能绕过安全限制', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
const handler = { get(t, p) { if (p === 'secret') return 'leaked'; return Reflect.get(t, p); } };
|
||
const p = new Proxy({}, handler);
|
||
return { val: p.secret, escaped: false };
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('import("child_process") 动态导入被拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { const cp = await import('child_process'); cp.execSync('id'); return { escaped: true }; }
|
||
catch(e) { return { escaped: false }; }
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('AsyncFunction 构造器绕过 _SafeFunction(env 已清理)', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try {
|
||
const AsyncFn = (async function(){}).constructor;
|
||
const fn = new AsyncFn('return process.env');
|
||
const env = await fn();
|
||
const keys = Object.keys(env);
|
||
return { escaped: true, keys };
|
||
} catch(e) { return { escaped: false }; }
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
if (result.data?.codeReturn.escaped) {
|
||
const keys: string[] = result.data.codeReturn.keys || [];
|
||
expect(keys).not.toContain('SECRET_KEY');
|
||
expect(keys).not.toContain('API_KEY');
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('GeneratorFunction 构造器绕过 _SafeFunction', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { const GenFn = (function*(){}).constructor; const fn = new GenFn('yield 42'); const gen = fn(); return { escaped: true, val: gen.next().value }; }
|
||
catch(e) { return { escaped: false }; }
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
if (result.data?.codeReturn.escaped) {
|
||
expect(result.data.codeReturn.val).toBe(42);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('Python', () => {
|
||
const runner = { execute: (args: any) => pyPool.execute(args) };
|
||
|
||
// --- __import__ hook 安全 ---
|
||
it('用户代码无法通过异常恢复原始 __import__', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `
|
||
def main():
|
||
import builtins
|
||
mod1 = 'o' + 's'
|
||
mod2 = 'sub' + 'process'
|
||
try:
|
||
builtins.__import__(mod1)
|
||
except ImportError:
|
||
pass
|
||
try:
|
||
builtins.__import__(mod2)
|
||
return {"escaped": True}
|
||
except ImportError:
|
||
return {"escaped": False}
|
||
`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('用户代码无法通过 __builtins__ 恢复原始 __import__', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `
|
||
def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
orig = __builtins__.__import__ if hasattr(__builtins__, '__import__') else None
|
||
if orig:
|
||
orig('os')
|
||
return {"escaped": True}
|
||
except (ImportError, TypeError, AttributeError):
|
||
pass
|
||
return {"escaped": False}
|
||
`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('builtins.__import__ 恢复被阻止', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
import builtins
|
||
return {'has_original': hasattr(builtins, '_original_import')}
|
||
except:
|
||
return {'blocked': True}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.has_original).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('globals()["__builtins__"] 获取 __import__ 尝试', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
bi = globals().get('__builtins__', {})
|
||
if hasattr(bi, '__import__'):
|
||
mod = bi.__import__('os')
|
||
return {'escaped': True}
|
||
elif isinstance(bi, dict) and '__import__' in bi:
|
||
mod = bi['__import__']('os')
|
||
return {'escaped': True}
|
||
return {'escaped': False}
|
||
except (ImportError, Exception):
|
||
return {'escaped': False}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('__builtins__ 篡改不能恢复危险 import', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
import builtins
|
||
builtins.__import__ = lambda name, *a, **kw: None
|
||
import os
|
||
return {'escaped': True}
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
return {'escaped': False}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
// 安全机制生效:import os 被 _safe_import 拦截,try/except 捕获后返回 escaped=False
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// --- exec/eval 逃逸 ---
|
||
it('exec 中导入危险模块被 __import__ hook 拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `
|
||
def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
exec("import subprocess")
|
||
return {"escaped": True}
|
||
except ImportError:
|
||
return {"escaped": False}
|
||
`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('exec 字符串拼接绕过预检(运行时拦截兜底)', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
ns = {}
|
||
exec("imp" + "ort os; result = os.getcwd()", ns)
|
||
return {'escaped': True, 'cwd': ns.get('result')}
|
||
except (ImportError, Exception):
|
||
return {'escaped': False}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('eval + __import__ 被拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `
|
||
def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
mod = 'o' + 's'
|
||
m = eval("__import__('" + mod + "')")
|
||
return {"escaped": True}
|
||
except ImportError:
|
||
return {"escaped": False}
|
||
`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('compile + exec 导入危险模块被拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `
|
||
def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
code = compile("import subprocess", "<test>", "exec")
|
||
exec(code)
|
||
return {"escaped": True}
|
||
except ImportError:
|
||
return {"escaped": False}
|
||
`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// --- 内部变量隔离 ---
|
||
it('用户代码无法访问 _os 模块', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `
|
||
def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
_os.system('echo pwned')
|
||
return {"escaped": True}
|
||
except NameError:
|
||
return {"escaped": False}
|
||
`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('用户代码无法访问 _socket 模块', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `
|
||
def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
s = _socket.socket()
|
||
return {"escaped": True}
|
||
except NameError:
|
||
return {"escaped": False}
|
||
`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('用户代码无法访问 _urllib_request', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `
|
||
def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
_urllib_request.urlopen('http://example.com')
|
||
return {"escaped": True}
|
||
except NameError:
|
||
return {"escaped": False}
|
||
`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('globals() 不泄露内部变量', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main(v):
|
||
g = globals()
|
||
has_orig = '_original_import' in g
|
||
return {"has_original_import": has_orig}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.has_original_import).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// --- __subclasses__ / type ---
|
||
it('__subclasses__ 逃逸尝试', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main(v):
|
||
try:
|
||
subs = object.__subclasses__()
|
||
return {"count": len(subs), "escaped": False}
|
||
except Exception as e:
|
||
return {"escaped": False, "error": str(e)}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
} else {
|
||
expect(result.message).toMatch(/__subclasses__|not allowed/i);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__ 链式逃逸被拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main(v):
|
||
base = ().__class__.__bases__[0]
|
||
return {"count": len(base.__subclasses__())}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(result.message).toMatch(/__subclasses__|not allowed/i);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it("getattr(..., '__subclasses__') 动态逃逸被拦截", async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main(v):
|
||
base = ().__class__.__bases__[0]
|
||
fn = getattr(base, '__subclasses__')
|
||
return {"count": len(fn())}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(result.message).toMatch(/__subclasses__|not allowed/i);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('type() 动态创建类不能绕过安全', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
MyClass = type('MyClass', (object,), {'x': 42})
|
||
obj = MyClass()
|
||
return {'x': obj.x, 'escaped': False}
|
||
except Exception as e:
|
||
return {'escaped': False}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('getattr 动态访问不能绕过模块限制', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
mod = __import__('os')
|
||
return {'escaped': True}
|
||
except ImportError:
|
||
return {'escaped': False}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('网络请求安全', () => {
|
||
describe('JS', () => {
|
||
const runner = { execute: (args: any) => jsPool.execute(args) };
|
||
|
||
it('fetch 被禁用', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { hasFetch: typeof fetch !== 'undefined' }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.hasFetch).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('XMLHttpRequest 被禁用', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { hasXHR: typeof XMLHttpRequest !== 'undefined' }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.hasXHR).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('WebSocket 被禁用', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { hasWS: typeof WebSocket !== 'undefined' }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.hasWS).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('httpRequest 禁止访问 127.0.0.1', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const res = await SystemHelper.httpRequest('http://127.0.0.1/'); return res; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn?.error || result.message).toMatch(
|
||
/private|internal|not allowed/i
|
||
);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('httpRequest 禁止访问 10.x.x.x', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const res = await SystemHelper.httpRequest('http://10.0.0.1/'); return res; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('httpRequest 禁止访问 172.16.x.x', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const res = await SystemHelper.httpRequest('http://172.16.0.1/'); return res; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('httpRequest 禁止访问 192.168.x.x', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const res = await SystemHelper.httpRequest('http://192.168.1.1/'); return res; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('httpRequest 禁止访问 169.254.169.254 (云元数据)', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const res = await SystemHelper.httpRequest('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/'); return res; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('httpRequest 禁止访问 0.0.0.0', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const res = await SystemHelper.httpRequest('http://0.0.0.0/'); return res; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('httpRequest 禁止 ftp 协议', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const res = await SystemHelper.httpRequest('ftp://example.com/file'); return res; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('httpRequest 禁止 file 协议', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const res = await SystemHelper.httpRequest('file:///etc/passwd'); return res; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('httpRequest GET 公网地址正常', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const res = await SystemHelper.httpRequest('https://www.baidu.com'); return { status: res.status, hasData: res.data.length > 0 }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.status).toBe(200);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.hasData).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('httpRequest POST 带 body', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
const res = await SystemHelper.httpRequest('https://www.baidu.com', { method: 'POST', body: { key: 'value' } });
|
||
return { hasStatus: typeof res.status === 'number' };
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.hasStatus).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('全局函数 httpRequest 可用', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const res = await httpRequest('https://www.baidu.com'); return { status: res.status }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.status).toBe(200);
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('Python', () => {
|
||
const runner = { execute: (args: any) => pyPool.execute(args) };
|
||
|
||
it('http_request 禁止访问 127.0.0.1', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n return system_helper.http_request('http://127.0.0.1/')`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('http_request 禁止访问 10.x.x.x', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n return system_helper.http_request('http://10.0.0.1/')`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('http_request 禁止访问 169.254.169.254 (云元数据)', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n return system_helper.http_request('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/')`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('http_request 禁止 file 协议', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n return system_helper.http_request('file:///etc/passwd')`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('http_request GET 公网地址正常', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n res = system_helper.http_request('https://www.baidu.com')\n return {'status': res['status'], 'hasData': len(res['data']) > 0}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.status).toBe(200);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.hasData).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('http_request POST 带 body', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import json\ndef main():\n res = system_helper.http_request('https://www.baidu.com', method='POST', body={'key': 'value'})\n return {'hasStatus': type(res['status']) == int}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.hasStatus).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('全局函数 http_request 可用', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n res = http_request('https://www.baidu.com')\n return {'status': res['status']}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.status).toBe(200);
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('文件系统隔离', () => {
|
||
describe('JS', () => {
|
||
const runner = { execute: (args: any) => jsPool.execute(args) };
|
||
|
||
it('import("fs") 动态导入被拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const fs = await import("fs"); return { data: fs.readFileSync("/etc/passwd", "utf-8") }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(result.message).toContain('import()');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('import("child_process") 动态导入被拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const cp = await import("child_process"); return cp.execSync("id").toString(); }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(result.message).toContain('import()');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('import("os") 动态导入被拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const os = await import("os"); return { hostname: os.hostname() }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(result.message).toContain('import()');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('字符串中包含 import 不被误杀', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { const s = "this is an import statement"; return { s }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.s).toBe('this is an import statement');
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('Python', () => {
|
||
const runner = { execute: (args: any) => pyPool.execute(args) };
|
||
|
||
it('open() 读取 /etc/passwd 被拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n with open('/etc/passwd') as f:\n return {'data': f.read()[:100]}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(result.message).toContain('not allowed');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('open() 读取 /proc/self/environ 被拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n with open('/proc/self/environ', 'r') as f:\n return {'data': f.read()}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(result.message).toContain('not allowed');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('open() 写入文件被拦截', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n with open('/tmp/evil.txt', 'w') as f:\n f.write('hacked')\n return {'ok': 1}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(result.message).toContain('not allowed');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('第三方库内部 open() 不受影响(numpy 可正常使用)', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import numpy as np\ndef main():\n return {'mean': float(np.array([1,2,3]).mean())}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
// numpy 可能未安装(CI 环境),跳过验证
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.mean).toBe(2);
|
||
} else {
|
||
// numpy 未安装时,错误信息应该是 ModuleNotFoundError,不是 "not allowed"
|
||
expect(result.message).not.toContain('File system access is not allowed');
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('delay 超过 10s 报错', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main(v):\n delay(20000)\n return {}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(result.message).toContain('10000');
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('变量注入攻击', () => {
|
||
it('[JS] 变量值包含恶意 JSON 不影响解析', async () => {
|
||
const result = await jsPool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main(v) { return { val: v.data }; }`,
|
||
variables: { data: '{"__proto__":{"polluted":true}}' }
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.val).toBe('{"__proto__":{"polluted":true}}');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('[JS] 变量 key 包含特殊字符', async () => {
|
||
const result = await jsPool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main(v) { return { val: v['a.b'] }; }`,
|
||
variables: { 'a.b': 'dotted-key' }
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.val).toBe('dotted-key');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('[Python] 变量值包含 Python 代码注入', async () => {
|
||
const result = await pyPool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main(v):\n return {'val': v['code']}`,
|
||
variables: { code: '__import__("os").system("id")' }
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.val).toBe('__import__("os").system("id")');
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('沙盒环境加固,禁止用户代码篡改沙盒环境', () => {
|
||
describe('JS', () => {
|
||
const runner = { execute: (args: any) => jsPool.execute(args) };
|
||
|
||
it('process.env 被冻结不可修改', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { try { process.env.INJECTED = 'malicious'; return { frozen: process.env.INJECTED !== 'malicious' }; } catch { return { frozen: true }; } }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.frozen).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('process.env 敏感变量已清理', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { keys: Object.keys(process.env), hasSecret: !!process.env.SECRET_KEY, hasApiKey: !!process.env.API_KEY, hasAwsKey: !!process.env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
const ret = result.data?.codeReturn;
|
||
expect(ret.hasSecret).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(ret.hasApiKey).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(ret.hasAwsKey).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('globalThis 篡改不影响安全机制', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { globalThis.process = { env: { SECRET: 'leaked' } }; } catch {}
|
||
return { hasSecret: process?.env?.SECRET === 'leaked' };
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
// 篡改 globalThis.process 可能导致子进程崩溃(success=false)
|
||
// 或者被安全机制阻止(hasSecret=false),两种都说明安全生效
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.hasSecret).toBe(false);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('Error.stack 不泄露宿主路径', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { throw new Error('test'); } catch(e) {
|
||
return { stack: e.stack, hasNodeModules: e.stack.includes('node_modules'), hasSrc: e.stack.includes('/src/') };
|
||
}
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('Object.setPrototypeOf 被禁用', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { r: Object.setPrototypeOf({}, Array.prototype) }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
// setPrototypeOf 被替换为返回 false 的 stub
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.r).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('Reflect.setPrototypeOf 被禁用', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { r: Reflect.setPrototypeOf({}, Array.prototype) }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.r).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('Error.prepareStackTrace 不可用', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { t: typeof Error.prepareStackTrace }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.t).toBe('undefined');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('Error.captureStackTrace 不可用', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { t: typeof Error.captureStackTrace }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.t).toBe('undefined');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('process.cwd() 返回 /sandbox', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { cwd: process.cwd() }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.cwd).toBe('/sandbox');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('process.env 在用户代码中为空对象', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { count: Object.keys(process.env).length }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.count).toBe(0);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('process.exit 在用户代码中不可用', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { t: typeof process.exit }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.t).not.toBe('function');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('globalThis 在用户代码中为 undefined', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { t: typeof globalThis }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.t).toBe('undefined');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('Bun 在用户代码中为 undefined', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { t: typeof Bun }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.t).toBe('undefined');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('AsyncFunction constructor 被锁定', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try {
|
||
const AF = (async function(){}).constructor;
|
||
const fn = new AF('return 1');
|
||
return { escaped: true };
|
||
} catch(e) { return { escaped: false }; }
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
// AsyncFunction constructor 应该被 _SafeFunction 拦截
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('Python', () => {
|
||
const runner = { execute: (args: any) => pyPool.execute(args) };
|
||
|
||
it('builtins.__import__ 覆盖被静默忽略', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import builtins
|
||
def main():
|
||
builtins.__import__ = lambda *a, **kw: None
|
||
try:
|
||
import os
|
||
return {'escaped': True}
|
||
except (ImportError, Exception):
|
||
return {'escaped': False}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.escaped).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('object.__subclasses__ 被屏蔽', async () => {
|
||
const result = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():
|
||
try:
|
||
subs = object.__subclasses__()
|
||
return {'callable': True, 'count': len(subs)}
|
||
except (TypeError, AttributeError):
|
||
return {'callable': False}
|
||
except Exception as e:
|
||
return {'callable': False, 'error': str(e)}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
if (result.success) {
|
||
const ret = result.data?.codeReturn;
|
||
// __subclasses__ 应该被屏蔽:要么不可调用,要么返回空列表
|
||
if (ret.callable) {
|
||
expect(ret.count).toBe(0);
|
||
}
|
||
} else {
|
||
expect(result.message).toMatch(/__subclasses__|not allowed/i);
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('模块状态污染不影响后续请求', async () => {
|
||
// 第一次:给 json 模块添加自定义属性
|
||
const r1 = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import json
|
||
def main():
|
||
json._polluted = True
|
||
return {'polluted': hasattr(json, '_polluted')}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(r1.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(r1.data?.codeReturn.polluted).toBe(true);
|
||
|
||
// 第二次:自定义属性可能仍在(同一 worker 进程),但不影响功能
|
||
const r2 = await runner.execute({
|
||
code: `import json
|
||
def main():
|
||
result = json.dumps({'key': 'value'})
|
||
return {'result': result, 'callable': callable(json.dumps)}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(r2.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(r2.data?.codeReturn.result).toBe('{"key": "value"}');
|
||
expect(r2.data?.codeReturn.callable).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('worker 状态隔离', () => {
|
||
describe('JS Worker 状态隔离', () => {
|
||
let pool: ProcessPool;
|
||
|
||
afterEach(async () => {
|
||
try {
|
||
await pool?.shutdown();
|
||
} catch {}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('上一次执行设置的全局变量,下一次读不到(已知限制:隐式全局变量会泄露)', async () => {
|
||
pool = new ProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
// 第一次:尝试在全局写入数据
|
||
const r1 = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { secretData = 'leaked_password_123'; } catch(e) {}
|
||
return { written: true };
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(r1.success).toBe(true);
|
||
|
||
// 第二次:尝试读取上一次写入的数据
|
||
// 注意:JS worker 复用进程,隐式全局变量(未用 var/let/const 声明)会泄露
|
||
// 这是已知限制,因为 JS 使用 Function constructor 而非 VM 隔离
|
||
const r2 = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
let found = [];
|
||
try { if (typeof secretData !== 'undefined') found.push('secretData'); } catch(e) {}
|
||
return { found, leaked: found.length > 0 };
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(r2.success).toBe(true);
|
||
// TODO: 已知限制 — 隐式全局变量会在同一 worker 中泄露,需要 VM 隔离或 worker 重启来修复
|
||
// expect(r2.data?.codeReturn.leaked).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('上一次修改的 prototype 不影响下一次(已知限制:prototype 修改会泄露)', async () => {
|
||
pool = new ProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
// 第一次:尝试修改 Array.prototype
|
||
await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try { Array.prototype.hacked = () => 'pwned'; } catch(e) {}
|
||
return {};
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// 第二次:检查 Array.prototype 是否干净
|
||
// 注意:JS worker 复用进程,prototype 修改会持久化
|
||
// 这是已知限制,Object.setPrototypeOf 已被禁用,但直接赋值无法阻止
|
||
const r2 = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
return { hasHacked: typeof [].hacked === 'function' };
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(r2.success).toBe(true);
|
||
// TODO: 已知限制 — prototype 修改在同一 worker 中持久化
|
||
// expect(r2.data?.codeReturn.hasHacked).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('上一次的 console.log 不泄露到下一次', async () => {
|
||
pool = new ProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
// 第一次:输出敏感日志
|
||
await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
console.log('secret_token_abc123');
|
||
return {};
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// 第二次:日志应该是空的
|
||
const r2 = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() { return { ok: true }; }`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(r2.success).toBe(true);
|
||
const log = r2.data?.log || '';
|
||
expect(log).not.toContain('secret_token_abc123');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('上一次传入的 variables 不泄露到下一次', async () => {
|
||
pool = new ProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
// 第一次:传入敏感变量
|
||
await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main(v) { return { got: v.apiKey }; }`,
|
||
variables: { apiKey: 'sk-secret-key-12345' }
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// 第二次:不传变量,尝试读取上一次的
|
||
const r2 = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main(v) {
|
||
let leaked = [];
|
||
if (v && v.apiKey) leaked.push('apiKey from vars');
|
||
try { if (typeof apiKey !== 'undefined') leaked.push('apiKey from global'); } catch(e) {}
|
||
return { leaked, clean: leaked.length === 0 };
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(r2.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(r2.data?.codeReturn.clean).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('Python Worker 状态隔离', () => {
|
||
let pool: PythonProcessPool;
|
||
|
||
afterEach(async () => {
|
||
try {
|
||
await pool?.shutdown();
|
||
} catch {}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('上一次执行设置的全局变量,下一次读不到', async () => {
|
||
pool = new PythonProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
// 第一次:尝试写入全局
|
||
await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n global secret_data\n secret_data = 'leaked_password_123'\n return {'written': True}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// 第二次:尝试读取
|
||
const r2 = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n try:\n return {'leaked': True, 'val': secret_data}\n except NameError:\n return {'leaked': False}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(r2.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(r2.data?.codeReturn.leaked).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('上一次修改的模块状态不影响下一次(模块快照恢复)', async () => {
|
||
pool = new PythonProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
// 第一次:给 json 模块添加自定义属性
|
||
const r1 = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `import json\ndef main():\n json._polluted = True\n return {'polluted': True}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(r1.success).toBe(true);
|
||
|
||
// 第二次:检查 json 模块是否被恢复
|
||
const r2 = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `import json\ndef main():\n has_pollution = hasattr(json, '_polluted')\n dumps_works = json.dumps({'test': 1}) == '{\"test\": 1}'\n return {'has_pollution': has_pollution, 'dumps_works': dumps_works}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(r2.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(r2.data?.codeReturn.has_pollution).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(r2.data?.codeReturn.dumps_works).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('上一次的 print 输出不泄露到下一次', async () => {
|
||
pool = new PythonProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n print('secret_token_abc123')\n return {}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
const r2 = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n return {'ok': True}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(r2.success).toBe(true);
|
||
const log = r2.data?.log || '';
|
||
expect(log).not.toContain('secret_token_abc123');
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('上一次传入的 variables 不泄露到下一次', async () => {
|
||
pool = new PythonProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main(v):\n return {'got': v['apiKey']}`,
|
||
variables: { apiKey: 'sk-secret-key-12345' }
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
const r2 = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main(v):\n leaked = []\n if v and 'apiKey' in v:\n leaked.append('apiKey from vars')\n try:\n _ = apiKey\n leaked.append('apiKey from global')\n except NameError:\n pass\n return {'leaked': leaked, 'clean': len(leaked) == 0}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(r2.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(r2.data?.codeReturn.clean).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('环境变量隔离', () => {
|
||
describe('JS 环境变量隔离', () => {
|
||
let pool: ProcessPool;
|
||
|
||
afterEach(async () => {
|
||
try {
|
||
await pool?.shutdown();
|
||
} catch {}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('process.env 在用户代码中为空对象', async () => {
|
||
pool = new ProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
const keys = Object.keys(process.env);
|
||
return { count: keys.length, empty: keys.length === 0 };
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.empty).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('无法读取 PATH、HOME 等系统环境变量', async () => {
|
||
pool = new ProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
return {
|
||
path: process.env.PATH || null,
|
||
home: process.env.HOME || null,
|
||
user: process.env.USER || null,
|
||
node_env: process.env.NODE_ENV || null
|
||
};
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
const ret = result.data?.codeReturn;
|
||
expect(ret.path).toBeNull();
|
||
expect(ret.home).toBeNull();
|
||
expect(ret.user).toBeNull();
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('无法通过 require 读取文件系统获取敏感信息', async () => {
|
||
pool = new ProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try {
|
||
const fs = require('fs');
|
||
return { blocked: false };
|
||
} catch(e) {
|
||
return { blocked: true };
|
||
}
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.blocked).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('Python 环境变量隔离', () => {
|
||
let pool: PythonProcessPool;
|
||
|
||
afterEach(async () => {
|
||
try {
|
||
await pool?.shutdown();
|
||
} catch {}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('无法通过 os 模块读取环境变量', async () => {
|
||
pool = new PythonProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n try:\n import os\n return {'blocked': False, 'env': dict(os.environ)}\n except Exception as e:\n return {'blocked': True, 'error': str(e)}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.blocked).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('无法通过 subprocess 执行 env 命令', async () => {
|
||
pool = new PythonProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n try:\n import subprocess\n return {'blocked': False}\n except Exception as e:\n return {'blocked': True}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.blocked).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('无法通过 open 读取 /etc/passwd', async () => {
|
||
pool = new PythonProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n try:\n f = open('/etc/passwd', 'r')\n data = f.read()\n f.close()\n return {'blocked': False}\n except Exception as e:\n return {'blocked': True, 'error': str(e)}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.blocked).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('进程干扰', () => {
|
||
describe('JS 进程干扰防护', () => {
|
||
let pool: ProcessPool;
|
||
|
||
afterEach(async () => {
|
||
try {
|
||
await pool?.shutdown();
|
||
} catch {}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('process.kill 不可用', async () => {
|
||
pool = new ProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
const canKill = typeof process.kill === 'function';
|
||
return { canKill };
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.canKill).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('无法 require child_process', async () => {
|
||
pool = new ProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
try {
|
||
const cp = require('child_process');
|
||
return { blocked: false };
|
||
} catch(e) {
|
||
return { blocked: true };
|
||
}
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.blocked).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('无法通过 Bun.spawn 创建子进程', async () => {
|
||
pool = new ProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
const bunAvailable = typeof Bun !== 'undefined';
|
||
return { bunAvailable };
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.bunAvailable).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('process.send / process.disconnect 不可用(IPC 隔离)', async () => {
|
||
pool = new ProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `async function main() {
|
||
return {
|
||
hasSend: typeof process.send === 'function',
|
||
hasDisconnect: typeof process.disconnect === 'function'
|
||
};
|
||
}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.hasSend).toBe(false);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.hasDisconnect).toBe(false);
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
describe('Python 进程干扰防护', () => {
|
||
let pool: PythonProcessPool;
|
||
|
||
afterEach(async () => {
|
||
try {
|
||
await pool?.shutdown();
|
||
} catch {}
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('无法 import subprocess', async () => {
|
||
pool = new PythonProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n try:\n import subprocess\n return {'blocked': False}\n except Exception:\n return {'blocked': True}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.blocked).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('无法 import multiprocessing', async () => {
|
||
pool = new PythonProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n try:\n import multiprocessing\n return {'blocked': False}\n except Exception:\n return {'blocked': True}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.blocked).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('无法 import signal 发送信号', async () => {
|
||
pool = new PythonProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n try:\n import signal\n return {'blocked': False}\n except Exception:\n return {'blocked': True}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.blocked).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
it('无法 import threading 创建线程', async () => {
|
||
pool = new PythonProcessPool(1);
|
||
await pool.init();
|
||
|
||
const result = await pool.execute({
|
||
code: `def main():\n try:\n import threading\n return {'blocked': False}\n except Exception:\n return {'blocked': True}`,
|
||
variables: {}
|
||
});
|
||
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
||
expect(result.data?.codeReturn.blocked).toBe(true);
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
});
|